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Update: Investigation of Anthrax Associated with Intentional Exposure and Interim Public Health Guidelines, October 2001

On October 4, 2001, CDC and state and local public health authorities reported a case of inhalational anthrax in Florida (1). Additional cases of anthrax subsequently have been reported from Florida and New York City. This report updates the findings of these case investigations, which indicate that infections were caused by the intentional release of *Bacillus anthracis*. This report also includes interim guidelines for postexposure prophylaxis for prevention of inhalational anthrax and other information to assist epidemiologists, clinicians, and laboratorians responding to intentional anthrax exposures.

For these investigations, a confirmed case of anthrax was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal illness* that is laboratory confirmed by isolation of *B. anthracis* from an affected tissue or site or 2) other laboratory evidence of *B. anthracis* infection based on at least two supportive laboratory tests. A suspected case was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of illness without isolation of *B. anthracis* and no alternative diagnosis, but with laboratory evidence of *B. anthracis* by one supportive laboratory test or 2) a clinically compatible case of anthrax epidemiologically linked to a confirmed environmental exposure, but without corroborative laboratory evidence of *B. anthracis* infection.

Laboratory criteria for diagnosis of anthrax consist of 1) isolation and confirmation of *B. anthracis* from a clinical specimen collected from an affected tissue or site or 2) other supportive laboratory tests, including (a) evidence of *B. anthracis* DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from specimens collected from an affected tissue or site, (b) demonstration of *B. anthracis* in a clinical specimen by immunohistochemical staining, or (c) other laboratory tests (e.g., serology) that may become validated by laboratory confirmation.

^{*}Cutaneous illness is characterized by a skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar; edema, erythema, or necrosis without ulceration may be present. Inhalational illness is characterized by a brief prodrome resembling a "nonspecific febrile" illness that rapidly progresses to a fulminant illness with signs of sepsis and/or respiratory failure, often with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening; signs of bacterial meningitis may be present. Gastrointestinal illness is characterized by severe abdominal pain usually accompanied by bloody vomiting or diarrhea followed by fever and signs of septicemia.

Anthrax — Continued

Florida

On October 2, the Palm Beach County Health Department (PBCHD) and the Florida Department of Health (FDOH) were notified of a possible anthrax case in Palm Beach County. The suspected case was identified when a gram stain of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) revealed a gram-positive bacilli. An epidemiologic investigation was initiated by FDOH, PBCHD, and the FDOH state laboratory. The state laboratory and CDC confirmed *B. anthracis* from a culture of CSF on October 4. Later the same day, FDOH and CDC epidemiologists and laboratory workers arrived in Palm Beach County to assist PBCHD with the investigation. As of October 16, two confirmed cases of inhalational anthrax have been identified.

The index patient was a 63-year-old male resident of Palm Beach County who sought medical care at a local hospital on October 2 with fever and altered mental status. Despite antibiotic therapy, his clinical condition deteriorated rapidly, and he died on October 5. An autopsy performed on October 6 confirmed the cause of death as inhalational anthrax. An investigation revealed no obvious exposures to *B. anthracis*.

On October 1, the second patient, a 73-year-old co-worker of the index patient, was admitted to a local hospital for pneumonia. On October 5, a nasal swab was obtained from the patient that yielded a positive culture for *B. anthracis*. Subsequent testing revealed positive PCR tests for *B. anthracis* in hemorrhagic pleural fluid and reactive serologic tests. The patient remains hospitalized on antibiotic therapy. Enhanced case finding and retrospective and prospective surveillance systems were initiated in Palm Beach, and surrounding counties. Environmental assessments and sampling were performed at the index patient's home, work site, and travel destinations for the 60 days preceding symptom onset. Environmental sampling revealed *B. anthracis* contamination of the work site, specifically implicating mail or package delivery. Environmental samples of other locations the patient visited, including extensive sampling of his home, were negative.

Questionnaires were administered to employees at the index patient's work site. Postexposure prophylaxis was administered, and nasal swabs were obtained from those with exposure to the work site for >1 hour since August 1. Of 1,075 nasal swabs performed, one was positive for *B. anthracis*. Environmental and co-worker testing indicated contamination of specific locations at the work site. The investigation and environmental sampling are ongoing.

New York

On October 9, the New York City Department of Health notified CDC of a person with a skin lesion consistent with cutaneous anthrax. CDC sent a team to New York City to provide epidemiologic and laboratory support to local health officials. As of October 16, two persons with confirmed cases of cutaneous anthrax have been identified. One person with confirmed anthrax was a 38-year-old woman who had handled a suspicious letter postmarked September 18 at her workplace. The letter contained a powder that subsequently was confirmed to contain *B. anthracis*. On September 25, the patient had a raised lesion on the chest, which over the next 3 days developed surrounding erythema and edema. By September 29, the patient developed malaise and headache. On October 1, a clinician examined the patient and described an approximately 5 cm long oval-shaped lesion with a raised border, small satellite vesicles, and profound edema. The lesion was nonpainful and was associated with left cervical lymphadenopathy. Serous fluid from the lesion was obtained and was negative by gram stain and culture. The

Anthrax — Continued

patient was prescribed oral ciprofloxacin. Over the next several days, the lesion developed a black eschar, and a biopsy was obtained and sent to CDC for testing. The tissue was positive by immunohistochemical staining for the cell wall antigen of *B. anthracis*.

The other person with confirmed cutaneous anthrax was a 7-month-old infant who visited his mother's workplace on September 28. The next day, the infant had an apparently nontender, massively edematous, weeping skin lesion on his left arm; he was treated with intravenous antibiotics. Over the next several days, the lesion became ulcerative and developed a black eschar; clinicians presumptively attributed the lesion to a spider bite. The infant's clinical course was complicated by hemolytic anemia and thrombocytopenia, requiring intensive care. The diagnosis of cutaneous anthrax was first considered on October 12 after the announcement of the other confirmed anthrax case in New York City. A serum specimen collected on October 2 was positive for *B. anthracis* by PCR testing at CDC; a skin biopsy obtained on October 13 was positive by immunohistochemical staining at CDC for the cell wall antigen of *B. anthracis*. No suspicious letter with powder was identified at the mother's workplace. Both patients were treated with ciprofloxacin and are clinically improving.

B. anthracis grew from swabs (two nasal and one facial skin swab) from three other persons, suggesting exposure to anthrax. One of the exposures was in a law enforcement officer who brought the letter containing *B. anthracis* from the index patient's workplace to the receiving laboratory. The other two exposures were in technicians who had processed the letter in the laboratory. Environmental sampling in both workplaces is ongoing and investigations of other exposed persons continue.

Reported by: L Bush, MD, Atlantis; J Malecki, MD, Palm Beach County Health Dept, Palm Beach; S Wiersma, MD, State Epidemiologist, Florida Dept of Health. K Cahill, MD, R Fried, MD; M Grossman, MD, Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center; W Borkowsky, MD, New York Univ Medical Center, New York, New York; New York City Dept of Health. National Center for Infectious Diseases; and EIS officers, CDC.

Editorial Note: The findings in this report indicate that four confirmed cases of anthrax have resulted from intentional delivery of *B. anthracis* spores through mailed letters or packages. These are the first confirmed cases of anthrax associated with intentional exposure in the United States and represent a new public health threat.

Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by the spore-forming bacterium *B. anthracis*. It occurs most frequently as an epizootic or enzootic disease of herbivores (e.g., cattle, goats, or sheep) that acquire spores from direct contact with contaminated soil. Humans usually become infected through direct contact with *B. anthracis* spores from infected animals or their products (e.g., goat hair), resulting in cutaneous anthrax (2) (Box 1). Inhalational and gastrointestinal are other forms of the disease in the natural setting (4,5). Human-to-human transmission has not been documented.

Clinical laboratorians should be alert to the presence of *Bacillus* species in patient specimens. In particular, laboratorians should suspect *B. anthracis* when the specimen is from a previously healthy patient with a rapidly progressive respiratory illness or a cutaneous ulcer. If *B. anthracis* is suspected, laboratories should immediately notify the health-care provider and local and state public health staff. For rapid identification of *B. anthracis*, state and local health departments should access the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN). LRN links state and local public health laboratories with advanced capacity laboratories—including clinical, military, veterinary, agricultural, water, and food-testing laboratories. Laboratorians should contact their state public health laboratory to identify their local LRN representative.

Anthrax — Continued

BOX 1. Clinical forms of anthrax

Clinical Forms of Anthrax

The following clinical descriptions of anthrax are based on experience in adults. The clinical presentation of anthrax in infants is not well defined.

Inhalational. Inhalational anthrax begins with a brief prodrome resembling a viral respiratory illness followed by development of hypoxia and dyspnea, with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening. Inhalational anthrax is the most lethal form of anthrax and results from inspiration of 8,000–50,000 spores of *Bacillus anthracis* (3). The incubation period of inhalational anthrax among humans typically ranges from 1–7 days but may be possibly up to 60 days. Host factors, dose of exposure, and chemoprophylaxis may affect the duration of the incubation period. Initial symptoms include mild fever, muscle aches, and malaise and may progress to respiratory failure and shock; meningitis frequently develops. Case-fatality estimates for inhalational anthrax are extremely high, even with all possible supportive care including appropriate antibiotics.

Cutaneous. Cutaneous anthrax is characterized by a skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar. The incubation period ranges from 1–12 days. The lesion is usually painless, but patients also may have fever, malaise, headache, and regional lymphadenopathy. The case fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax is 20% without, and <1% with, antibiotic treatment.

Gastrointestinal. Gastrointestinal anthrax is characterized by severe abdominal pain followed by fever and signs of septicemia. This form of anthrax usually follows after eating raw or undercooked contaminated meat and can have an incubation period of 1–7 days. An oropharyngeal and an abdominal form of the disease have been described. Involvement of the pharynx is usually characterized by lesions at the base of the tongue, dysphagia, fever, and regional lymphadenopathy. Lower bowel inflammation typically causes nausea, loss of appetite, and fever followed by abdominal pain, hematemesis, and bloody diarrhea. The casefatality rate is estimated to be 25%–60%. The effect of early antibiotic treatment on the case-fatality rate is not established.

Update: Investigation of Anthrax — Continued

TABLE 1. Interim recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis for prevention of inhalational anthrax after intentional exposure to *Bacillus anthracis*

Category	Initial therapy	Duration
Adults (including pregnant women	Ciprofloxacin 500 mg po BID	60 days
and immunocompromised persons)	or	
	Doxycycline 100 mg po BID	
Children	Ciprofloxacin 10–15 mg/kg po Q12 hrs*	60 days
	or	
	Doxycycline:	
	>8 yrs and >45 kg: 100 mg po BID	
	>8 yrs and ≤45 kg: 2.2 mg/kg po BID	
	≤8 yrs: 2.2 mg/kg po BID	

^{*}Ciprofloxacin dose should not exceed 1 gram per day in children.

Postexposure prophylaxis is indicated to prevent inhalational anthrax after a confirmed or suspected aerosol exposure. When no information is available about the antimicrobial susceptibility of the implicated strain of *B. anthracis*, initial therapy with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended for adults and children (Table 1). Use of tetracyclines and fluoroquinolones in children has adverse effects. The risks for these adverse effects must be weighed carefully against the risk for developing life-threatening disease. As soon as penicillin susceptibility of the organism has been confirmed, prophylactic therapy for children should be changed to oral amoxicillin 80 mg/kg of body mass per day divided every 8 hours (not to exceed 500 mg three times daily). *B. anthracis* is not susceptible to cephalosporins or to trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, and these agents should not be used for prophylaxis.

CDC is assisting other states and local areas in assessing anthrax exposures. Additional information about anthrax and the public health response is available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov. This information was current as of 4 p.m., eastern daylight time, October 17, 2001.

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Recognition of Illness Associated with the Intentional Release of a Biologic Agent

On September 11, 2001, following the terrorist incidents in New York City and Washington, D.C., CDC recommended heightened surveillance for any unusual disease occurrence or increased numbers of illnesses that might be associated with the terrorist attacks. Subsequently, cases of anthrax in Florida and New York City have demonstrated

the risks associated with intentional release of biologic agents (1). This report provides guidance for health-care providers and public health personnel about recognizing illnesses or patterns of illness that might be associated with intentional release of biologic agents.

Health-Care Providers

Health-care providers should be alert to illness patterns and diagnostic clues that might indicate an unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with intentional release of a biologic agent and should report any clusters or findings to their local or state health department. The covert release of a biologic agent may not have an immediate impact because of the delay between exposure and illness onset, and outbreaks associated with intentional releases might closely resemble naturally occurring outbreaks. Indications of intentional release of a biologic agent include 1) an unusual temporal or geographic clustering of illness (e.g., persons who attended the same public event or gathering) or patients presenting with clinical signs and symptoms that suggest an infectious disease outbreak (e.g., ≥2 patients presenting with an unexplained febrile illness associated with sepsis, pneumonia, respiratory failure, or rash or a botulism-like syndrome with flaccid muscle paralysis, especially if occurring in otherwise healthy persons); 2) an unusual age distribution for common diseases (e.g., an increase in what appears to be a chickenpox-like illness among adult patients, but which might be smallpox); and 3) a large number of cases of acute flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies, suggestive of a release of botulinum toxin.

CDC defines three categories of biologic agents with potential to be used as weapons, based on ease of dissemination or transmission, potential for major public health impact (e.g., high mortality), potential for public panic and social disruption, and requirements for public health preparedness (2). Agents of highest concern are *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), *Yersinia pestis* (plague), variola major (smallpox), *Clostridium botulinum* toxin (botulism), *Francisella tularensis* (tularemia), filoviruses (Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marburg hemorrhagic fever); and arenaviruses (Lassa [Lassa fever], Junin [Argentine hemorrhagic fever], and related viruses). The following summarizes the clinical features of these agents (3–6).

Anthrax. A nonspecific prodrome (i.e., fever, dyspnea, cough, and chest discomfort) follows inhalation of infectious spores. Approximately 2–4 days after initial symptoms, sometimes after a brief period of improvement, respiratory failure and hemodynamic collapse ensue. Inhalational anthrax also might include thoracic edema and a widened mediastinum on chest radiograph. Gram-positive bacilli can grow on blood culture, usually 2–3 days after onset of illness. Cutaneous anthrax follows deposition of the organism onto the skin, occurring particularly on exposed areas of the hands, arms, or face. An area of local edema becomes a pruritic macule or papule, which enlarges and ulcerates after 1–2 days. Small, 1–3 mm vesicles may surround the ulcer. A painless, depressed, black eschar usually with surrounding local edema subsequently develops. The syndrome also may include lymphangitis and painful lymphadenopathy.

Plague. Clinical features of pneumonic plague include fever, cough with muco-purulent sputum (gram-negative rods may be seen on gram stain), hemoptysis, and chest pain. A chest radiograph will show evidence of bronchopneumonia.

Botulism. Clinical features include symmetric cranial neuropathies (i.e., drooping eyelids, weakened jaw clench, and difficulty swallowing or speaking), blurred vision or diplopia, symmetric descending weakness in a proximal to distal pattern, and respiratory

dysfunction from respiratory muscle paralysis or upper airway obstruction without sensory deficits. Inhalational botulism would have a similar clinical presentation as foodborne botulism; however, the gastrointestinal symptoms that accompany foodborne botulism may be absent.

Smallpox (variola). The acute clinical symptoms of smallpox resemble other acute viral illnesses, such as influenza, beginning with a 2–4 day nonspecific prodrome of fever and myalgias before rash onset. Several clinical features can help clinicians differentiate varicella (chickenpox) from smallpox. The rash of varicella is most prominent on the trunk and develops in successive groups of lesions over several days, resulting in lesions in various stages of development and resolution. In comparison, the vesicular/pustular rash of smallpox is typically most prominent on the face and extremities, and lesions develop at the same time.

Inhalational tularemia. Inhalation of *F. tularensis* causes an abrupt onset of an acute, nonspecific febrile illness beginning 3–5 days after exposure, with pleuropneumonitis developing in a substantial proportion of cases during subsequent days (7).

Hemorrhagic fever (such as would be caused by Ebola or Marburg viruses). After an incubation period of usually 5–10 days (range: 2–19 days), illness is characterized by abrupt onset of fever, myalgia, and headache. Other signs and symptoms include nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, chest pain, cough, and pharyngitis. A maculopapular rash, prominent on the trunk, develops in most patients approximately 5 days after onset of illness. Bleeding manifestations, such as petechiae, ecchymoses, and hemorrhages, occur as the disease progresses (8).

Clinical Laboratory Personnel

Although unidentified gram-positive bacilli growing on agar may be considered as contaminants and discarded, CDC recommends that these bacilli be treated as a "finding" when they occur in a suspicious clinical setting (e.g., febrile illness in a previously healthy person). The laboratory should attempt to characterize the organism, such as motility testing, inhibition by penicillin, absence of hemolysis on sheep blood agar, and further biochemical testing or species determination.

An unusually high number of samples, particularly from the same biologic medium (e.g., blood and stool cultures), may alert laboratory personnel to an outbreak. In addition, central laboratories that receive clinical specimens from several sources should be alert to increases in demand or unusual requests for culturing (e.g., uncommon biologic specimens such as cerebrospinal fluid or pulmonary aspirates).

When collecting or handling clinical specimens, laboratory personnel should 1) use Biological Safety Level II (BSL-2) or Level III (BSL-3) facilities and practices when working with clinical samples considered potentially infectious; 2) handle all specimens in a BSL-2 laminar flow hood with protective eyewear (e.g., safety glasses or eye shields), use closed-front laboratory coats with cuffed sleeves, and stretch the gloves over the cuffed sleeves; 3) avoid any activity that places persons at risk for infectious exposure, especially activities that might create aerosols or droplet dispersal; 4) decontaminate laboratory benches after each use and dispose of supplies and equipment in proper receptacles; 5) avoid touching mucosal surfaces with their hands (gloved or ungloved), and never eat or drink in the laboratory; and 6) remove and reverse their gloves before leaving the laboratory and dispose of them in a biohazard container, and wash their hands and remove their laboratory coat.

When a laboratory is unable to identify an organism in a clinical specimen, it should be sent to a laboratory where the agent can be characterized, such as the state public health

laboratory or, in some large metropolitan areas, the local health department laboratory. Any clinical specimens suspected to contain variola (smallpox) should be reported to local and state health authorities and then transported to CDC. All variola diagnostics should be conducted at CDC laboratories. Clinical laboratories should report any clusters or findings that could indicate intentional release of a biologic agent to their state and local health departments.

Infection-Control Professionals

Heightened awareness by infection-control professionals (ICPs) facilitates recognition of the release of a biologic agent. ICPs are involved with many aspects of hospital operations and several departments and with counterparts in other hospitals. As a result, ICPs may recognize changing patterns or clusters in a hospital or in a community that might otherwise go unrecognized.

ICPs should ensure that hospitals have current telephone numbers for notification of both internal (ICPs, epidemiologists, infectious diseases specialists, administrators, and public affairs officials) and external (state and local health departments, Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, and CDC Emergency Response office) contacts and that they are distributed to the appropriate personnel (9). ICPs should work with clinical microbiology laboratories, on- or off-site, that receive specimens for testing from their facility to ensure that cultures from suspicious cases are evaluated appropriately.

State Health Departments

State health departments should implement plans for educating and reminding health-care providers about how to recognize unusual illnesses that might indicate intentional release of a biologic agent. Strategies for responding to potential bioterrorism include 1) providing information or reminders to health-care providers and clinical laboratories about how to report events to the appropriate public health authorities; 2) implementing a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week capacity to receive and act on any positive report of events that suggest intentional release of a biologic agent; 3) investigating immediately any report of a cluster of illnesses or other event that suggests an intentional release of a biologic agent and requesting CDC's assistance when necessary; 4) implementing a plan, including accessing the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism, to collect and transport specimens and to store them appropriately before laboratory analysis; and 5) reporting immediately to CDC if the results of an investigation suggest release of a biologic agent.

Reported by: National Center for Infectious Diseases; Epidemiology Program Office; Public Health Practice Program Office; Office of the Director, CDC.

Editorial Note: Health-care providers, clinical laboratory personnel, infection control professionals, and health departments play critical and complementary roles in recognizing and responding to illnesses caused by intentional release of biologic agents. The syndrome descriptions, epidemiologic clues, and laboratory recommendations in this report provide basic guidance that can be implemented immediately to improve recognition of these events.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, state and local health departments initiated various activities to improve surveillance and response, ranging from enhancing communications (between state and local health departments and between public health agencies and health-care providers) to conducting special surveillance projects. These special projects have included active surveillance for changes in the number of hospital

admissions, emergency department visits, and occurrence of specific syndromes. Activities in bioterrorism preparedness and emerging infections over the past few years have better positioned public health agencies to detect and respond to the intentional release of a biologic agent. Immediate review of these activities to identify the most useful and practical approaches will help refine syndrome surveillance efforts in various clinical situations.

Information about clinical diagnosis and management can be found elsewhere (1–9). Additional information about responding to bioterrorism is available from CDC at http://www.bt.cdc.gov; the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebook.html; the Association for Infection Control Practitioners at http://www.apic.org; and the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org.

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Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity — United States, October 10–16, 2001

The following report summarizes West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance data reported to CDC through ArboNET and verified by states and other jurisdictions as of October 16, 2001.

During the week of October 10–16, six human cases of WNV encephalitis were reported in Florida (five) and Maryland (one). During the same period, WNV infections were reported in 312 crows, 50 other birds, and 12 horses. A total of 23 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported in four states (Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).

During 2001, 31 human cases of WNV encephalitis have been reported in Florida (nine), Maryland (six), New York (six), Connecticut (five), New Jersey (four), and Georgia (one); one death occurred in Georgia. Among these 31 cases, 16 (52%) were in males, the

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median age was 70 years (range: 37–81 years), and dates of illness onset ranged from July 14 to September 30. A total of 3,695 crows and 1,349 other birds with WNV infection were reported from 25 states and the District of Columbia (Figure 1); 125 WNV infections in other animals (all horses) were reported from 11 states (Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia); and 694 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported from 14 states (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).

Additional information about WNV activity is available at http://cindi.usgs.gov/hazard/event/west_nile/west_nile.html.





FIGURE 1. Areas reporting West Nile virus (WNV) activity — United States, 2001*

^{*} As of October 9, 2001.

[†] Mississippi reported WNV infection in a horse but no birds.

FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week totals ending October 13, 2001, with historical data



^{*} No rubella cases were reported for the current 4-week period yielding a ratio for week 41 of zero (0).

TABLE I. Summary of provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, cumulative, week ending October 13, 2001 (41st Week)*

	Cum. 2001		Cum. 2001
Anthrax	4	Poliomyelitis, paralytic	_
Brucellosis†	65	Psittacosis†	16
Cholera	3	O fever [†]	18
Cyclosporiasis [†]	121	Rabies, human	1
Diphtheria	2	Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF)	432
Ehrlichiosis: human granulocytic (HGE) [†]	166	Rubella, congenital syndrome	-
human monocytic (HME)†	70	Streptococcal disease, invasive, group A	2,892
Encephalitis: California serogroup viral [†]	66	Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome [†]	47
eastern equine [†]	6	Syphilis, congenital ¹	166
St. Louis [†]	l 1	Tetanus	22
western equine [†]	-	Toxic-shock syndrome	93
Hansen disease (leprosy)†	67	Trichinosis	21
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome [†]	7	Tularemia [†]	88
Hemolytic uremic syndrome, postdiarrheal [†]	112	Typhoid fever	205
HIV infection, pediatric ¹⁵	153	Yellow fever	-
Plague	2		

[†] Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.

^{-:} No reported cases.
*Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date).

[†] Not notifiable in all states.

⁵ Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHSTP). Last update September 25, 2001. Updated from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, NCHSTP.

TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

				, 2001,					coli O157:H7	
	Cum.	Cum.	Chlan Cum.	nydia⁵ Cum.	Cryptosı Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	PH Cum.	LIS Cum.
Reporting Area UNITED STATES	2001 [¶] 29,580	2000 29,952	2001 545,524	2000 545,047	2001 2,281	2000 2,395	2001 2,312	2000 3,759	2001 1,788	2000 3,083
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	1,129 36 31 13 602 78 369	1,586 27 27 29 998 75 430	18,058 839 1,042 485 7,619 2,322 5,751	18,211 1,153 862 417 7,787 2,111 5,881	103 15 10 30 39 4 5	2,395 119 17 20 24 32 3 23	2,312 209 25 31 13 109 12	331 24 31 31 31 149 18 78	202 26 24 8 105 10 29	340 27 31 33 155 16 78
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	6,710 731 3,385 1,389 1,205	6,678 662 3,609 1,295 1,112	60,361 10,704 23,412 8,600 17,645	51,045 1,587 20,896 8,704 19,858	215 86 70 7 52	309 97 146 15 51	172 133 8 31 N	375 244 21 110 N	165 121 10 34	265 57 15 110 83
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	2,238 430 264 992 413 139	2,865 430 282 1,568 437 148	82,862 17,284 11,055 21,277 23,337 9,909	93,623 24,706 10,490 26,170 19,401 12,856	848 145 68 1 150 484	818 220 54 102 81 361	589 140 70 130 76 173	922 225 105 173 125 294	430 132 39 128 67 64	656 201 77 139 100 139
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	637 108 71 312 2 22 52 70	680 129 69 318 2 7 53 102	27,824 4,958 3,797 10,345 728 1,389 2,175 4,432	30,973 6,375 4,197 10,504 695 1,440 2,962 4,800	350 137 72 34 12 6 88 1	256 55 68 26 9 15 74	385 148 73 42 17 37 51	538 132 165 94 15 51 56 25	301 98 57 68 29 40	518 165 134 84 18 57 45
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	9,497 203 1,506 644 723 61 726 577 1,031 4,026	8,257 156 1,056 569 556 46 505 639 991 3,739	103,994 2,041 8,880 2,372 14,233 1,837 16,445 8,986 21,691 27,509	103,012 2,279 11,208 2,540 12,214 1,691 17,704 7,562 21,634 26,180	265 6 32 10 22 2 24 - 100 69	372 5 9 13 15 3 21 - 134 172	187 4 22 - 46 10 41 8 24 32	307 2 29 1 57 14 75 21 35 73	120 6 1 U 36 8 28 11 15	254 1 1 U 555 11 65 16 36 69
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	1,423 278 456 347 342	1,507 159 635 395 318	38,106 7,007 11,564 10,404 9,131	39,948 6,283 11,372 12,454 9,839	39 4 12 13 10	43 5 10 15 13	116 57 36 16 7	113 38 48 7 20	95 46 36 6 7	97 31 47 9 10
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	3,141 159 665 186 2,131	3,005 149 493 259 2,104	82,225 5,753 13,644 8,132 54,696	82,679 5,312 14,511 7,125 55,731	31 6 7 11 7	140 10 10 15 105	70 11 3 25 31	210 54 13 17 126	64 25 24 15	260 37 44 15 164
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	1,073 14 17 3 231 103 437 90 178	1,105 11 19 7 259 116 348 108 237	31,678 1,507 1,440 642 6,899 4,738 11,130 1,513 3,809	30,634 1,094 1,447 629 8,697 3,878 10,136 1,656 3,097	177 28 20 6 33 21 7 58 4	132 10 13 5 58 14 10 18	233 16 54 5 80 11 23 30	356 30 60 15 131 19 42 47	118 - - 1 51 9 22 34 1	262 33 9 96 16 34 64 10
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	3,732 395 154 3,112 16 55	4,269 379 113 3,669 15 93	100,416 10,661 5,753 79,029 2,037 2,936	94,922 10,221 5,251 74,661 1,981 2,808	253 43 42 164 1 3	206 U 16 190	351 99 59 172 4 17	607 193 124 250 27 13	293 62 56 168 1 6	431 189 106 122 3 11
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	10 934 2 - -	13 1,023 27 - -	1,930 53 U 103	400 U - U U	- - U -	- - U U	N 1 - U -	N 6 - U U	U U U U	U U U U

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases. C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.

*Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

*Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

*Chlamydia refers to genital infections caused by *C. trachomatis*.

*Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Last updated September 25, 2001.

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

	eka enami	CCLOBE	13, 2001,	and Oct	LUDEI 14	r, 2000	(41St Week)				
	Gono	rrhea	Hepati Non-A,		Legione	llosis	Listeriosis		me ease		
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000		
UNITED STATES	251,083	278,456	2,616	2,502	775	848	369	10,020	13,549		
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	5,190 90 149 53 2,394 645 1,859	5,131 73 87 53 2,132 501 2,285	14 - - 6 8 - -	24 2 - 4 13 5 -	49 8 9 5 12 6 9	48 2 2 5 16 8 15	32 - 4 2 18 1 7	3,179 - 112 - 14 - 653 - 413 1,987	4,277 - 55 29 1,071 414 2,708		
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	30,196 6,626 9,801 5,261 8,508	30,253 5,482 9,072 5,890 9,809	1,311 50 - 1,214 47	554 29 - 489 36	157 53 16 7 81	232 66 38 20 108	57 25 8 10 14	5,039 2,731 2 927 1,379	7,076 2,992 163 2,297 1,624		
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	44,730 9,700 4,773 13,133 13,630 3,494	55,615 14,991 4,939 16,446 13,700 5,539	142 8 1 13 120	190 10 - 18 162	202 95 18 - 58 31	222 89 30 28 39 36	49 13 8 1 20 7	501 100 20 - 1 380	729 53 21 33 22 600		
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak.	11,850 1,596 997 6,355 32 223	13,992 2,503 967 6,888 57 238	558 9 - 536 -	453 5 1 436 -	45 9 7 19 1 3	53 7 13 23 - 2	15 - 2 8 -	332 277 28 22 -	278 187 27 45 1		
Nebr. Kans.	710 1,937	1,183 2,156	3 10	4 7	5 1	4 4	1 4	3 2	3 15		
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	64,371 1,212 4,858 2,187 8,422 526 13,452 6,083 11,882 15,749	72,962 1,350 7,695 2,035 8,144 520 14,499 6,635 13,986 18,098	94 - 15 - 9 18 6 - 46	86 2 11 3 3 14 13 2 3 35	165 8 31 7 20 N 7 10 9	156 8 54 4 30 N 13 4 6	61 - 11 - 11 5 4 5 11	724 49 462 10 110 10 35 5	965 167 563 5 128 26 42 7		
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	24,639 2,779 7,813 8,065 5,982	28,722 2,777 9,121 9,572 7,252	167 8 56 3 100	376 31 78 7 260	48 11 23 12 2	29 16 9 3 1	19 5 8 6	48 22 17 8 1	46 10 28 5 3		
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	40,347 3,550 9,437 3,739 23,621	43,705 3,107 10,753 3,150 26,695	165 3 78 3 81	605 7 354 7 237	5 - 2 3 -	21 7 2 12	17 1 - 2 14	79 - 1 - 78	72 5 7 - 60		
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	7,910 84 61 64 2,332 799 3,034 120 1,416	8,300 38 65 40 2,516 854 3,418 167 1,202	56 1 2 6 17 11 9 3 7	62 4 3 2 12 13 16	45 3 1 13 2 18 5 3	33 1 5 - 11 1 7 8	29 1 1 7 6 6 2 6	11 - 6 1 1 - - 1 2	10 - 2 3 - - - 2 3		
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	21,850 2,374 902 17,789 325 460	19,776 1,808 745 16,576 278 369	109 19 12 78 -	152 26 24 100 - 2	59 7 N 48 - 4	54 15 N 38 - 1	90 7 8 69 - 6	107 8 7 90 2 N	96 7 9 78 2 N		
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	461 6 U 10	43 408 - U U	1 - U	3 1 U	2 - U	1 - U U	- - - -	N - U	N U U		

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

	CK3 CHAII	ig Octob	10, 20	o i, aliu O	TODE! 14	Salmonellosis†						
	Mal	aria	Rabi	es, Animal	NE	TSS		HLIS				
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000				
UNITED STATES	894	1,172	5,393	5,683	28,425	30,983	22,957	26,461				
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	62 4 2 1 26 7 22	63 6 1 2 29 8 17	592 55 20 55 214 53 195	660 106 19 50 221 46 218	1,977 153 150 65 1,110 113 386	1,839 107 117 98 1,060 117 340	1,912 137 136 63 1,042 147 387	1,878 88 121 94 1,065 130 380				
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	217 55 105 25 32	312 59 180 41 32	1,000 641 24 161 174	1,036 657 11 156 212	3,371 977 803 651 940	4,024 979 999 981 1,065	3,212 1,043 1,091 657 421	4,344 1,070 1,083 848 1,343				
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	88 21 15 1 33 18	118 16 5 58 26 13	118 42 3 24 43 6	144 47 - 22 64 11	3,818 1,091 438 956 660 673	4,305 1,146 515 1,290 723 631	3,569 1,061 399 1,049 658 402	2,903 1,189 520 79 788 327				
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	30 6 6 11 - 2 5	47 13 2 15 2 1 8 6	286 40 70 38 33 25 4 76	471 73 69 49 105 85 2 88	1,795 485 281 503 53 134 125 214	1,959 445 297 579 48 82 191 317	1,848 474 263 744 73 111 -	2,141 573 291 725 68 90 130 264				
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	234 2 100 13 43 1 13 6 12	262 4 86 15 46 3 30 2 19 57	1,839 30 279 - 373 118 482 97 294 166	1,950 42 341 - 462 100 473 136 268 128	6,965 79 676 68 1,113 103 1,055 676 1,128 2,067	6,310 95 651 52 808 131 885 593 1,144 1,951	4,746 87 723 U 747 107 905 595 1,210 372	4,879 112 578 U 768 124 935 468 1,442 452				
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	30 12 11 5 2	41 17 10 13 1	180 25 96 57 2	170 19 88 62 1	2,068 299 510 575 684	1,894 312 483 526 573	1,505 192 633 409 271	1,488 219 664 498 107				
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	10 3 4 2 1	67 3 11 8 45	875 20 - 56 799	744 20 3 50 671	2,965 719 286 379 1,581	3,971 583 690 322 2,376	1,461 92 566 292 511	2,409 472 565 248 1,124				
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	44 2 3 - 19 3 7 3 7	40 1 3 - 20 - 7 4 5	216 31 28 20 - 14 108 14 1	238 60 9 50 - 19 82 10 8	1,738 60 115 50 482 243 489 179 120	2,224 77 101 52 602 194 575 392 231	1,418 4 43 484 186 503 175 23	2,113 95 47 584 179 617 411 180				
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	179 8 10 151 1	222 24 34 154 - 10	287 - 2 248 37	270 - 7 237 26	3,728 406 194 2,803 34 291	4,457 466 248 3,499 52 192	3,286 491 266 2,218 28 283	4,306 561 304 3,208 33 200				
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	3 - U -	2 5 U U	73 - U -	64 - U U	455 - U 11	21 545 - U U	UUUUU	U U U U				

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

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TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

we	eks enain		er 13, 20 ellosis†	UI, and U	T	<u>I, 2000 (41</u> ophilis	st vveek)	к) "		
	NET:		_	PHLIS		& Secondary)	Tube	rculosis		
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000		
UNITED STATES	13,764	17,642	6,215	10,123	4,507	4,763	9,409	11,031		
NEW ENGLAND	220	335	233	325	47	64	326	319		
Maine N.H.	6	10 5	2	11 8	1	1 1	8 13	12 16		
Vt. Mass.	7 169	4 238	5 162	221	2 26	44	4 185	4 186		
R.I. Conn.	17 15	24 54	23 38	26 59	8 10	4 14	29 87	27 74		
MID. ATLANTIC	1,054	2,158	669	1,382	400	225	1,792	1,764		
Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City	413 279	611 852	101 319	180 584	21 212	9 94	268 906	236 950		
N.J. Pa.	185 177	455 240	184 65	391 227	105 62	57 65	386 232	415 163		
E.N. CENTRAL	3,383	3,509	1,573	1,010	759	948	1,014	1,081		
Ohio Ind.	2,378 179	295 1,332	1,045 34	251 139	65 130	63 287	182 80	227 107		
III. Mich.	326 256	1,020 579	288 182	44 527	229 316	339 217	487 203	504 172		
Wis.	244	283	24	49	19	42	62	71		
W.N. CENTRAL Minn.	1,449 354	1,957 650	1,054 341	1,673 733	69 22	58 15	362 175	396 124		
lowa Mo.	335 268	425 580	276 170	292 410	4 20	10 26	34 109	28 147		
N. Dak.	20	16	27	49	-	-	3	2		
S. Dak. Nebr.	350 63	6 99	206	4 82	5	2	12 29	14 18		
Kans.	59	181	34	103	18	5 1 500	1 001	63		
S. ATLANTIC Del.	1,924 13	2,332 19	636 10	978 20	1,584 9	1,589 8	1,891 15	2,243 14		
Md. D.C.	127 48	164 67	<i>7</i> 5 U	94 U	188 43	238 31	170 51	196 23		
Va. W. Va.	264 8	366 4	124 8	304 3	86 3	107 3	191 25	209 23		
N.C. S.C.	290 221	259 107	143 112	235 80	370 195	400 182	267 146	271 218		
Ga. Fla.	216 737	193 1,153	130 34	149 93	287 403	302 318	361 665	499 790		
E.S. CENTRAL	1,244	858	473	462	497	708	615	744		
Ky. Tenn.	553 78	352 279	236 84	74 334	38 264	65 425	90 221	95 279		
Ala. Miss.	182 431	58 169	124 29	48 6	95 100	99 119	211 93	247 123		
W.S. CENTRAL	1,831	2,761	721	868	562	653	742	1.627		
Ark. La.	474 117	165 230	155 137	48 141	27 130	82 177	119	154 146		
Okla. Tex.	52 1,188	93 2,273	17 412	38 641	55 350	97 297	111 512	124 1,203		
MOUNTAIN	762	933	547	675	194	189	377	411		
Mont. Idaho	4 33	7 43	-	25	1	- 1	6 8	14 7		
Wyo. Colo.	3 188	5 202	1 210	3 162	1	1 8	3 90	2 68		
N. Mex.	109	121	69	86	35 18	15	23	36		
Ariz. Utah	313 49	379 67	213 46	261 72	124 8 7	159 1	165 30	165 38		
Nev.	63	109	8	66		4	52	81		
PACIFIC Wash.	1,897 1 <u>5</u> 9	2,799 388	309 167	2,750 358	395 41	329 53	2,290 190	2,446 193		
Oreg. Calif.	70 1,607	149 2,224	87 -	98 2,264	13 331	10 265	82 1,862	<i>7</i> 8 1,981		
Alaska Hawaii	6 55	7 31	6 49	3 27	10	- 1	40 116	86 108		
Guam P.R.	- 8	34 29	U	U U	- 172	3 127	- 76	44 119		
V.I. Amer. Samoa	Ū	U U	Ŭ	Ü	U	127 - U	Ü	- U		
C.N.M.I.	4	Ü	Ü	Ü	4	Ü	23	Ü		

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and

cumulative (year-to-date).

† Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

TABLE III. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

		ienzae,	H	lepatitis (V	iral), By Ty	ре			_	les (Rubec	ola)	
		sive	Α	1 0	В	1 0	Indige		Impo		Tota	
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001§	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000
UNITED STATES	1,027	985	7,943	10,327	5,087	5,534	-	49	-	42	91	71
NEW ENGLAND Maine	71 2	78 1	492 10	308 15	<i>7</i> 7 5	92 5	-	4	-	1	5	6
N.H.	4	12	16	18	12	15	-	-	-	-	-	3
Vt. Mass.	3 35	7 36	12 209	8 116	4 3	6 13	-	1 2	-	1	1 3	3 -
R.I. Conn.	3 24	4 18	46 199	22 129	22 31	18 35	-	- 1	-	-	- 1	-
MID. ATLANTIC	152	185	755	1,198	828	933	-	4	_	11	15	21
Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City	58 36	77 50	205 216	193 410	111 332	102 457	-	1 2	-	4 1	5 3	10 10
N.J. Pa.	38 20	35 23	159 175	233 362	169 216	146 228	U	- 1	U	1 5	1	- 1
E.N. CENTRAL	139	150	834	1,349	701	575	_	-	_	10	10	7
Ohio Ind.	56 43	45 26	190 90	219 85	86 41	90 41	-	-	-	3	3	2
III.	10	50	233	582	118	98	-	-	-	3	3	3
Mich. Wis.	8 22	9 20	267 54	392 71	456 -	313 33	-	-	-	-	-	2
W.N. CENTRAL Minn.	54 32	61 32	337 34	582 163	161 17	235 34	-	4 2	-	-	4 2	1 1
lowa Mo.	13	- 19	30 90	59 237	21 87	27 117	-	2	-	-	2	-
N. Dak. S. Dak.	7	2	3 2	3	1	2 1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nebr. Kans.	1	3 4	30 148	27 92	19 15	33 21	-	-	-	-	-	-
S. ATLANTIC	300	225	1,906	1,134	1,141	963	-	4	-	1	5	3
Del. Md.	- 73	- 65	219	12 167	- 117	13 104	-	2	-	- 1	3	-
D.C. Va.	- 25	- 35	43 109	20 120	11 139	27 128	-	- 1	-	-	- 1	2
W. Va. N.C.	14 42	8 20	18 173	52 117	20 173	10 188	-		-	-	-	
S.C. Ga.	5 68	7 54	64 728	61 223	26 295	13 162	-	- 1	-	-	- 1	-
Fla.	73	36	552	362	360	318	-	-	-	-	-	1
E.S. CENTRAL Ky.	63 2	39 12	316 113	341 43	357 41	369 63	-	2	-	-	2 2	-
Tenn. Ala.	33 26	16 9	119 68	120 44	189 73	173 46	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miss.	20	2	16	134	54	87	-	-	-	-	-	-
W.S. CENTRAL Ark.	37	61 2	1,055 60	1,947 120	492 77	920 82	-	1	-	-	1	-
La. Okla.	3 34	16 41	55 104	70 213	32 70	129 124	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tex.	-	2	836	1,544	313	585	-	1	-	-	1	-
MOUNTAIN Mont.	121	95 1	624 10	724 6	413 3	416 6	-	1	-	1	2	12
Idaho	1	4	53	22	10	6	-	-	-	1	1	-
Wyo. Colo.	31	1 23	7 76	4 166	90 90	3 74	-	-	-	-	-	2
N. Mex. Ariz.	19 54	19 35	31 338	61 365	124 125	116 152	-	1	-	-	1	-
Utah Nev.	6 10	8 4	60 49	45 55	23 36	19 40	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	3 7
PACIFIC	90	91	1,624	2,744	917	1,031	-	29	-	18	47	21
Wash. Oreg.	2 17	5 27	114 67	239 148	114 78	86 91	-	13 4	-	2	15 4	3
Calif. Alaska	43 6	31 6	1,426 14	2,333 11	700 9	834 9	-	10	-	11 -	21 -	14 1
Hawaii	22	22	3	13	16	11	-	2	-	5	7	3
Guam P.R.	1	1 4	91	1 216	136	9 229	U	-	U	-	-	2
V.I. Amer. Samoa	Ū	Ü	Ū	Ü	U	Ü	U	Ū	U	Ū	Ū	U
C.N.M.I.	-	U	-	U	28	U	U	-	U	-	-	U

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

† For imported measles, cases include only those resulting from importation from other countries.

§ Of 216 cases among children aged <5 years, serotype was reported for 112, and of those, 20 were type b.

TABLE III. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending October 13, 2001, and October 14, 2000 (41st Week)*

		ococcal	1 0010	ber 14,	2000	(4130)			Data II.			
	Cum.	ease Cum.		Mumps Cum.	Cum.		Pertussis Cum.	Cum.		Rubella Cum.	Cum.	
Reporting Area UNITED STATES	2001	2000	2001	2001	2000	2001	2001	2000	2001	2001	2000	
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I.	1,708 93 3 12 5 49 4	1,764 109 8 11 3 62 9	2 - - - - -	171 - - - - -	270 4 - - 1 1	44 - - - - -	3,620 333 21 26 27 237 5	5,329 1,333 35 97 199 946 16	- - - - -	20 - - - - - -	125 12 - 2 - 8 1	
Conn. MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	20 175 49 32 41 53	16 195 56 38 37 64	- - - U	19 3 9 3 4	2 22 9 6 3 4	- 4 4 - U	17 249 124 38 18 69	40 543 266 73 30 174	- - - - U	5 1 3 1	1 9 1 8 -	
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	227 75 35 22 53 42	313 74 36 74 93 36	- - - -	16 1 1 11 3	20 7 1 6 5	1 - - 1 -	497 257 67 59 53 61	608 263 85 83 73 104	- - - - -	3 1 2 -	1 - - 1 -	
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	123 18 24 44 6 5 12	124 18 26 60 2 5 6	- - - - -	7 3 - - - 1 3	17 7 4 1 - 2 3	2 - - 2 - - -	205 70 19 85 4 4 4 19	444 268 46 65 6 4 21 34	- - - - - -	3 - 1 1 - - - 1	1 - - - 1	
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	322 4 37 - 33 12 60 31 38 107	251 1 26 - 37 12 32 20 41	2 2	32 - 5 - 6 - 4 5 7 5	39 - 9 - 9 - 5 10 2 4	- - - - - - -	191 - 30 1 36 2 58 31 7 26	393 8 98 3 90 1 77 26 35 55	- - - - - - -	6 1 - - - - 2 2	73 1 - - - 64 6	
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	116 19 54 30 13	119 25 48 33 13	- - - -	6 1 1 - 4	5 1 2 2	2 - 2 -	124 31 55 34 4	99 50 29 17 3	- - - -	- - - -	6 1 1 4	
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	186 17 58 26 85	188 11 42 25 110	- - - -	10 1 2 - 7	28 1 5 - 22	25 5 - 20	365 22 2 11 330	305 33 19 21 232	- - - -	1 - - - 1	8 1 1 - 6	
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	83 4 7 5 29 12 13 7 6	76 4 7 - 26 7 22 7 3	- - - - - - - U	11 1 1 1 2 1 1 3	17 1 - 1 - 1 4 4 6	9 - - 4 1 4 - U	1,134 31 168 1 224 129 498 71	630 35 57 4 361 81 63 17	- - - - - - - U	1 - - 1 - - -	2 1 1	
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	383 58 34 278 2 11	389 44 53 276 8	- N - -	70 1 N 32 1 36	118 9 N 81 8 20	1 1 - - -	522 130 44 311 6 31	974 322 99 498 19 36	- - - - -	1 - - - 1	13 7 - 6 -	
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	- 4 - U -	- 9 - U U	U U U U	- - - U -	13 - - U U	U U U U	- 2 - U -	3 6 - U U	U U U U	- - - U -	1 - - U U	

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases.

* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

TABLE IV. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending October 13, 2001 (41st Week)

	,	All Cau	ıses, By	Age (Y		<u> </u>	P&I	701 (415t We		All Cau	ıses, By	/ Age (Y	ears)		 P&l [†]
Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total	Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total
NEW ENGLAND Boston, Mass. Bridgeport, Conn Cambridge, Mass Fall River, Mass. Hartford, Conn. Lowell, Mass. Lynn, Mass. New Bedford, Ma New Haven, Conn Providence, R.I. Somerville, Mass Springfield, Mass Waterbury, Conn. Worcester, Mass. MID. ATLANTIC Albany, N.Y. Allentown, Pa. Buffalo, N.Y. Camden, N.J. Elizabeth, N.J.	. 12 23 70 14 13 sss. 23 1. 41 51 . 7	434 110 41 11 50 9 9 22 22 26 36 5 34 22 48 1,578 32 17 60 22	27 7 15 12 3 3 1 8 9 1 6 1 13 532 13 2 10 11	47 7 4 - 6 7 2 1 - 6 4 1 6 - 3 338 7 1 5	6 2 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 64 - 2 3 3	5 -2 - - - 1 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - -	44 17 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 4 5 4 117 5 2 3 4	S. ATLANTIC Atlanta, Ga. Baltimore, Md. Charlotte, N.C. Jacksonville, Fla Miami, Fla. Norfolk, Va. Richmond, Va. Savannah, Ga. St. Petersburg, F Tampa, Fla. Washington, D.G Wilmington, D.G E.S. CENTRAL Birmingham, Ala Chattanooga, Te Knoxville, Tenn. Lexington, Ky. Memphis, Tenn. Mobile, Ala. Montgomery, Al	61 50 46 62 Fla. 63 172 C. 99 I. 20 846 a. 183 nn. 60 105 66 185 76	734 119 97 69 76 27 29 25 44 49 120 573 126 40 79 39 117 48	272 52 34 27 35 22 11 16 31 26 31 36 32 14 17 18 37 18	115 26 13 8 10 9 5 3 6 6 17 12 - 59 11 4 5 13	28 6 5 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 7 1	20 3 4 5 2 2 3 - - 1 - 22 4 - 1 3 11 1	53 4 8 9 5 4 1 10 2 - 70 23 2 5 4 13 2 7
Erie, Pa.§ Jersey City, N.J. New York City, N.J. New York N.J. Paterson, N.J. Philadelphia, Pa.§ Reading, Pa. Rochester, N.Y. Schenectady, N.Y Scranton, Pa.§ Syracuse, N.Y. Trenton, N.J. Utica, N.Y. Yonkers, N.Y.	43 28 Y. 1,313 73 32 437 48 17 139	31 19 765 32 18 269 31 125 20 32 56 15 22 U	8 5 285 22 6 97 13 2 21 4 3 14 8	4 4 221 14 5 48 2 1 8 1 6 1 3	25 3 1 17 2 1 3 - 5 1 1 U	16 2 2 6 1 2 - 4	1 - 42 4 - 21 5 - 11 5 4 7 2 1 U	Nashville, Tenn. W.S. CENTRAL Austin, Tex. Baton Rouge, La Corpus Christi, I Dallas, Tex. El Paso, Tex. Houston, Tex. Little Rock, Ark. New Orleans, La. San Antonio, Te Shreveport, La. Tulsa, Okla.	133 1,180 55 60 Fex. 51 170 71 102 281 61 . U x. 189 30	92 755 40 35 33 119 49 61 159 35 U 132 17 75	28 257 9 17 12 34 15 27 76 13 U 30 8 16	9 112 2 4 3 8 7 10 30 9 U 22 4 13	2 30 1 2 1 6 - 4 8 2 U 2 - 4	2 26 3 2 2 3 - 8 2 U 3 1 2	14 56 2 - 2 16 - 5 14 - U 12 - 5
E.N. CENTRAL Akron, Ohio Canton, Ohio Canton, Ohio Chicago, III. Cincinnati, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio Columbus, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Detroit, Mich. Evansville, Ind. Fort Wayne, Ind. Gary, Ind. Grand Rapids, Mi Indianapolis, Ind. Lansing, Mich. Milwaukee, Wis. Peoria, III. Rockford, III. South Bend, Ind. Toledo, Ohio Youngstown, Ohi W.N. CENTRAL Des Moines, Iowa Duluth, Minn. Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Mo. Lincoln, Nebr. Minneapolis, Min Omaha, Nebr. St. Louis, Mo. St. Paul, Minn. Wichita, Kans.	176 35 107 51 55 49 111 0 49 690 1 22 . 31 86 40	1,109 36 27 U2 92 119 90 92 38 32 126 85 41 39 74 45 26 45 41 41 46 49 32	10 8 U 15 344 386 37 11 12 6 10 28 5 15 6 12 8 23 7 146 5 6 12 16 6 25 12 8 21 2 2 8 21 2 2 2 2	110 1 3 10 2 11 17 25 3 3 3 1 14 2 5 2 1 2 7 5 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3	37 - U 4 3 4 2 7 - 2 1 - 6 - 24 2 1 1 1 2 - 1 1 2 - 1 2 - 1 - 1 2 - 1 2 - 1 2 - 1 - 1 2 - 1 - 1 2 - 1 - 1 2 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	32 1 · U 2 5 5 2 5 · 1 1 2 3 · 1 2 · · · 1 1 7 · · · 1 · 5 5 5 · 1	10354U9257155612641247261 5511112497163	MOUNTAIN Albuquerque, N Boise, Idaho Colo. Springs, C Denver, Colo. Las Vegas, Nev. Ogden, Utah Phoenix, Ariz. Pueblo, Colo. Salt Lake City, U Tucson, Ariz. PACIFIC Berkeley, Calif. Fresno, Calif. Glendale, Calif. Honolulu, Hawa Long Beach, Cali Los Angeles, Cal Pasadena, Calif. Portland, Oreg. Sacramento, Cal San Diego, Calif. San Francisco, C San Jose, Calif. Santa Cruz, Calif Seattle, Wash. Spokane, Wash. Tacoma, Wash.	25 olo. 66 102 200 35 163 25 14h 122 137 1,390 8 105 25 11 58 11. 159 27 144 11f. 159 21 1	655 75 20 50 66 121 99 96 18 85 95 5 65 21 42 44 241 18 96 10 124 69 43 7,265	199 25 2 10 19 49 6 28 5 23 32 265 3 23 3 12 15 5 3 4 33 32 36 10 10 19 19 49 6 6 7 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	81 8 24 10 21 27 6 96 - 14 - 3 3 3 24 2 7 13 15 15 10 - 6 6 3 6 6 6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	34 2 2 2 7 11 6 4 32 5 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 2 7 7 7 7 7 8 2 7 8 2 9 1 9 1 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	18 2 1 - 5 2 - 7 - 1 1 5 1 3 2 2 1 U U - 5 1 1 9 8	59 4 2 3 9 11 3 8 2 5 12 101 4 1 6 10 20 5 7 13 18 U U 2 9 4 2 9 4 6 6 5 7 13 8 9 4 9 6 9 13 9 9 14 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9

[:] Unavailable. -:No reported cases.

Mortality data in this table are reported voluntarily from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of ≥100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included. Pneumonia and influenza.

Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.
 Total includes unknown ages.

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