

MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY

WEEKLY REPORT

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Coccidioidomycosis in Workers at an Archeologic Site — Dinosaur National Monument, Utah, June–July 2001

Coccidioidomycosis is a fungal infection caused by inhalation of airborne *Coccidioides immitis* spores that are present in the arid soil of the southwestern United States, California, and parts of Central and South America. Infection with *C. immitis* previously has not been diagnosed in patients outside these areas, except in travelers returning from areas where the disease is endemic (1). This report describes an outbreak of coccidioidomycosis in workers at an archeologic site in northeastern Utah during June– July, 2001, and represents the first identification of coccidioidomycosis in northern Utah. Health-care providers should consider coccidioidomycosis in the differential diagnosis for patients with compatible illness who reside in or recently have traveled to this area. Interventions to minimize soil disturbance and dust inhalation can reduce the risk for coccidioidomycosis.


Dinosaur National Monument (DNM) encompasses 320 square miles in northeastern Utah and northwestern Colorado; 397,800 persons visited DNM in 2000 (Figure 1). On June 18, 2001, under the direction of National Park Service (NPS) archeologists, six student volunteers and two leaders began work at an archeologic site in DNM. Work included laying stone steps, building a retaining wall, and sifting dirt for artifacts. Peak dust exposure occurred on June 19, the day most sifting occurred. Workers did not wear protective facemasks. During June 29–July 3, all eight team members and two NPS archeologists who had worked at the site sought medical care at a local hospital emergency department for respiratory and systemic symptoms. All 10 persons had diffuse pulmonary infiltrates on chest radiographs; eight were hospitalized with pneumonia of unknown etiology. Pending investigation, NPS closed the work site to all visitors and staff, and the TriCounty Health Department alerted the public. On July 2, the TriCounty Health Department, the Utah Department of Health, and CDC initiated an investigation to identify the risk factors, cause, and extent of the outbreak.


During July 2–4, a total of 18 persons (the eight team members and 10 archeologists) with potential exposure to dust at the work site in June were interviewed using a standardized questionnaire to determine symptoms and previous activities. Hospital records were reviewed to ascertain clinical information. A case was defined as an illness with onset of at least two selected symptoms (i.e., self-reported fever, difficulty breathing, and cough) after June 18 in a person working at DNM.

Illness in 10 persons, including all eight team members and two NPS archeologists, met the case definition. Median age was 17 years (range: 16–29 years). Illness onset occurred during June 28–July 1. The most common symptoms included difficulty

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Coccidioidomycosis — Continued





Source: U.S. Geological Survey.

breathing (10), fever (10), cough (nine), fatigue (eight), shortness of breath (seven), myalgia (six), and generalized skin rash (six). All 10 persons present at the work site on June 19 had illness that met the case definition, compared with none of the eight who did not work that day (Fisher exact p-value=0.00002). One ill person had visited the work site only on June 19 and had illness onset on June 29.

Results of blood cultures from the hospitalized persons were negative for bacterial pathogens. Initial serologic tests were negative for antibodies to *Francisella tularensis*, *Yersinia pestis*, *Mycoplasma* species, *Histoplasma capsulatum*, and *C. immitis*. On further analysis, using serum specimens concentrated 3–5 fold in an assay that detects IgM antibodies (immunodiffusion tube precipitin), nine of the 10 acute serum specimens from patients contained IgM antibodies to *C. immitis*, confirming the diagnosis of acute coccidioidomycosis (*2*). All hospitalized patients were treated with fluconazole. The average length of hospital stay was 1.5 days.

Because approximately 60% of infections with *C. immitis* are asymptomatic, a serosurvey of park employees was conducted during August 15–17 to identify other infected persons and to guide prevention and control measures (1,3). Of the 40 park employees participating in the serosurvey, three (7.5%) reported "flu-like illness" since June. None of the 40 had detectable IgM or IgG antibodies to *C. immitis*. These results suggest that infection with *C. immitis* during the preceding 12 weeks was unlikely (2,4).

Investigation of the work site on July 3 revealed a desert environment with the ground covered with bedonite, a fine, alkaline soil that can provide a conducive environment for *C. immitis* spores. NPS is working with the U.S. Geological Survey to conduct mycologic studies of the soil (M. Bultman, personal communication, October 2001).

Coccidioidomycosis — Continued

On August 24, the state and local health departments jointly recommended that employees minimize soil disturbance and dust inhalation (e.g., watering down the soil and wearing National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH]-approved N95 respirators) at the work site to reduce their risk for *C. immitis* infection. During September 24–27, four NPS employees completed work on the retaining wall and steps. Subsequently, one developed respiratory illness consistent with coccidioidomycosis and laboratory evidence of acute infection (IgM and rising titer of IgG to *C. immitis*).

The site reopened on September 28. NPS guidelines advise DNM visitors to stay on maintained trails to avoid raising dust or stepping on native soil. Visitors' risk for infection with *C. immitis* should be minimal because their exposure to inhaled dust is substantially lower than that experienced by the persons in this outbreak. However, additional measures are being considered to minimize risk for visitors, including warnings to avoid the site when wind conditions are conducive to dust exposure. Surveillance is ongoing at area hospitals.

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Editorial Note: DNM is located approximately 200 miles north of the area of Utah where *C. immitis* is endemic. Soil disturbances can aerosolize *C. immitis* spores (arthroconidia) and result in coccidioidomycosis outbreaks (5). Other ground-disturbing activities, such as construction or archeology digs, may increase the risk for infection (*3,6*). A similar point-source outbreak of coccidioidomycosis occurred in 1970 among archeology students in an area of northern California where *C. immitis* was not known to be endemic. In both of these outbreaks, a high attack rate of symptomatic infection was reported (7).

Symptoms of acute coccidioidomycosis include fever, headache, rash, muscle aches, dry cough, weight loss, and malaise. Most infections are asymptomatic or self-limited and resolve without antimicrobial treatment in patients with healthy immune systems. In rare instances, severe lung disease or disseminated infection can develop in patients; susceptibility is higher in immunocompromised persons, pregnant women, and persons of African or Asian descent (8).

Because infection with *C. immitis* results in long-term immunity, the coccidioidin or spherulin skin test, which detects T-cell mediated delayed-type hypersensitivity to *C. immitis*, is the best method to screen for past infection (*3*). However, the coccidioidin skin test is not available in the United States. Therefore, a serosurvey was used to assess for subclinical cases of infection in this outbreak. In previous studies of asymptomatic persons who had positive skin tests, 7% had positive serologies; the time of exposure in those persons was unknown (*4*). The sensitivity of the serologic test is low for remote past infection and unknown for recent asymptomatic infection (*4*). Therefore, this investigation was unable to establish the prevalence of previous infection among tested NPS employees.

In settings where coccidioidomycosis outbreaks have occurred, measures to minimize soil disturbance and dust inhalation reduce the risk for inhalation of *C. immitis* spores (*3,6*). The most recent case indicates an ongoing risk for infection at the site associated with this outbreak and the importance of adherence to recommendations for

Coccidioidomycosis — Continued

respiratory protection (e.g., NIOSH-approved N95 respirators that are properly fitted and consistently worn) when dust exposure is unavoidable.

The outbreak in this location indicates that areas where *C. immitis* is endemic may extend farther north than previously documented. Surveillance should be continued in these areas. In addition, health-care providers should be alert for coccidioidomycosis cases in persons who reside in or have traveled to these areas and who may have been exposed to dust from disturbed soil.

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Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax, 2001

This report updates the investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax and the provision of antimicrobial prophylaxis to exposed persons and highlights CDC assistance to other countries investigating cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax. Since November 7, 2001, CDC and state and local public health agencies have identified no new cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax. As of November 14, a total of 22 cases of anthrax has met the CDC case definition (1); 10 were confirmed inhalational anthrax, and 12 (seven confirmed and five suspected) were cutaneous anthrax. Investigation of a case of inhalational anthrax in a hospital stock room worker aged 61 years in New York City (NYC) found no evidence of anthrax contamination at the work site or home; the source of exposure is unknown. Environmental clean-up of contaminated facilities continues, and surveillance for new cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax is ongoing in Delaware (DE), District of Columbia (DC), Florida (FL), Maryland (MD), New Jersey (NJ), NYC, Pennsylvania (PA), Virginia (VA), and other states.

Use of Antimicrobial Prophylaxis

A 60-day course of antibiotics to prevent inhalational anthrax has been recommended for persons potentially exposed to *Bacillus anthracis* aerosols in FL, NJ, NYC, VA, and DC. These recommendations are for persons at risk for inhalational anthrax by 1) the presence of an inhalational case at a facility (e.g., media company in FL),

Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax — Continued

2) environmental specimens positive for *B. anthracis* in facilities along the path of a contaminated letter in which aerosolization might have occurred (e.g., postal facilities in NYC), and 3) exposure to an air space known to be contaminated with aerosolized *B. anthracis* from an opened letter (e.g., Senate office building in DC). These persons should receive a full 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis. Specific recommendations by site include:

- Boca Raton, FL—prophylaxis is recommended for employees and visitors who spent >1 hour during August 1–October 6 in the American Media, Inc., building.
- New York City, NY—prophylaxis is recommended for all employees who worked during October 9–26 on the second and third floors of the south section of the Morgan Central Postal Facility in Manhattan.
- Hamilton Township, NJ—prophylaxis is recommended for all employees and business visitors (i.e., temporary postal workers, vendors, contractors, and anyone in nonpublic work sites) who were in the U.S. Postal Service Route 130 Processing and Distribution Center during September 18–October 18.
- Washington, DC (Capitol Hill)—prophylaxis is recommended for persons who were on the fifth and sixth floors of the southeast wing of the Senate Hart Building on October 15, from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m.
- Washington, DC—prophylaxis is recommended for all employees and business visitors to the nonpublic mail room of the U.S. Postal Service Processing and Distribution Center at 900 Brentwood Road during October 12–21.
- Sterling, VA—prophylaxis is recommended for all mail room employees and business visitors who were at the Department of State Annex 32 mail room facility during October 12–22.

In addition, a 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis is recommended for other workers with specified risks for inhalational anthrax. In some areas, local health authorities facilitated access to a 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis for persons who handled mail in facilities from which *B. anthracis* was isolated but did not have exposures for which antimicrobial prophylaxis is recommended (*2*). These persons may choose or may be directed by local health authorities to discontinue antimicrobial prophylaxis before completing a 60-day course.

CDC Assistance to Other Countries

CDC has assisted authorities in other countries investigating cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax. During October 12–November 13, CDC received 111 requests from 66 countries. Of these, 47 (42%) requests were laboratory related; 43 (39%) were general requests for bioterrorism information; 13 (12%) were for environmental or occupational health guidelines; and eight (7%) were about developing bioterrorism preparedness plans. The largest proportion of requests were from Central and South America (26%). Of the 66 countries, 15 (23%) received laboratory assistance, including testing or arrangements for testing of suspected isolates at a CDC-supported laboratory or a reference laboratory in another country. Forty-two (64%) countries received telephone or e-mail consultation regarding specific tests for suspected *B. anthracis.* These isolates were recovered from the outer surface of letters or packages sent in State Department pouches to the U.S. Embassy in Peru. These items were processed at the U.S. State Department mail sorting facility where a case of inhalational anthrax had occurred (1). No cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax have been confirmed in U.S. Embassy

Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax — Continued

employees or in persons from other countries. Requests for information regarding bioterrorism-related issues outside the United States should be directed to the International Team of CDC's Emergency Operations Center (telephone, [770] 488-7100, e-mail, eocinternational@cdc.gov).

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Editorial Note: Since the previous report, all patients with bioterrorism-related anthrax who were hospitalized have been discharged and continue to recover; no new cases have been reported. The source of these bioterrorist attacks has not been identified, and additional cases might occur. Public health authorities, health-care providers, and laboratorians should remain vigilant for cases of anthrax.

Antimicrobial prophylaxis is indicated to prevent inhalational anthrax after a confirmed or suspected aerosol exposure. Persons recommended to receive prophylaxis should complete the 60-day regimen. Public health programs should work with healthcare providers and patients to promote completion of antimicrobial prophylaxis and to monitor the occurrence of adverse events (1).

CDC continues to respond to inquiries about anthrax and bioterrorism. The CDC Public Response Hotline was established to provide the public with information about anthrax and other biologic and chemical agents. During November 1–12, CDC received approximately 4,400 calls through the hotline and to the Emergency Operations Center. The hotline is available in English (888-246-2675) and Spanish (888-246-2857). CDC also receives requests for information by e-mail through the Health Alert Network (<healthalert@cdc.gov>), *MMWR* (<http://www.cdc/gov/mmwr/contact.html>), and other public health communications systems.

Additional information about anthrax is available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov>. A compendium of *MMWR* reports and recommendations related to anthrax and bioterrorism is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr>.

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n-Hexane–Related Peripheral Neuropathy Among Automotive Technicians — California, 1999–2000

Solvents, glues, spray paints, coatings, silicones, and other products contain normal (n-) hexane, a petroleum distillate and simple aliphatic hydrocarbon. n-Hexane is an isomer of hexane and was identified as a peripheral neurotoxin in 1964 (1). Since then, many cases of n-hexane–related neurotoxicity have occurred in printing plants, sandal shops, and furniture factories in Asia, Europe, and the United States (2). This report describes an investigation of n-hexane–associated peripheral neuropathy in an automotive technician, an occupation in which this condition has not been reported, and summarizes the results of two other case investigations in the automotive repair industry. The findings suggest that solvent manufacturers should avoid using hexane when producing automotive degreasing products, and automotive technicians should avoid regular contact with hexane-based cleaning solvents.

In December 1998, the California Department of Health Services (CDHS) received a report from an occupational-medicine physician of a patient with peripheral neuropathy associated with occupational exposure to n-hexane at an automotive repair facility. The index patient was a 24-year-old male automotive technician who had worked in the industry during June 1995–April 1997. In January 1997, numbness and tingling developed in his hands and feet then spread proximally to his forearms and waist. In March, a neurologic evaluation revealed bilaterally diminished reflexes of the biceps, patellar, and Achilles' deep tendon. Vibration and pinprick sensations were reduced from the lower third of the forearms and downward from the waist; the result of his Romberg test was positive. Tests evaluating his metabolic and thyroid function; urinary cadmium, arsenic, lead, and mercury levels; and central nervous system imaging were normal; however, nerve conduction velocity studies revealed a subacute progressive mixed motorsensory neuropathy with distal nerve involvement. He had reported using from one to nine 15-oz. aerosol cans of brake cleaner per day during the 22 months of his employment. This brake cleaner contained 50%-60% hexane (composed of 20%-80% n-hexane), 20%–30% toluene, and 1%–10% each of methyl ethyl ketone (MEK), acetone, isopropanol, methanol, and mixed xylenes. The technician sprayed the product on brakes, tools, small spills, and engine surfaces. He occasionally used a rag. He reported wearing latex gloves daily and drinking alcohol occasionally. His condition improved with cessation of n-hexane exposure; however, he continues to have paresthesias in the hands and feet.

To assess the possible occurrence of n-hexane–related peripheral neuropathy at other automotive repair facilities, during 1999, CDHS screened for n-hexane–related peripheral neuropathy at a local automotive dealership that used an aerosol product containing 1%–5% n-hexane and 2% MEK. This facility was chosen for convenience and the employees' willingness to participate. A case of n-hexane–related peripheral neuropathy was defined as symptoms and results of nerve conduction velocity tests consistent with peripheral neuropathy in an automotive technician who had chronic occupational exposure to hexane-containing solvents and no other explanation for peripheral neuropathy. Screening included a medical history, an exposure questionnaire, physical and neurologic examinations, nerve conduction velocity studies, and neurophysiologic testing for cognitive and motor function, reaction time, and color vision. At CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), recent exposure to n-hexane was estimated by measuring 2,5-hexanedione (2,5-HD), a urinary metabolite, in acid-hydrolyzed urine samples. Air samples were not tested because management had removed the hexane-containing solvent from the facility at the onset of the investigation.

n-Hexane-Related Peripheral Neuropathy — Continued

Six (40%) of 15 technicians from this facility participated in the screening. All participants had worked \geq 20 years as technicians; one met the case definition for n-hexane-related peripheral neuropathy. Three of the six had detectable 2,5-HD levels, which were 7.0%, 26.0%, and 6.4% of the biologic exposure index (BEI) of 5 mg 2,5-HD/g creatinine. The BEI is a biomarker that correlates to the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists' 8-hour threshold limit value (ACGIH TLV) of 50 ppm (*3*). The exposure values identified are considered acceptable by this standard.

During August 2000, CDHS surveyed California neurologists* to identify additional cases of n-hexane-related peripheral neuropathy and to determine whether exposure had occurred among persons while working in automotive repair facilities. A total of 58 (20%) of 291 neurologists responded to the survey. One automotive technician was identified with n-hexane-related peripheral neuropathy. CDHS reviewed the medical records and verified that the technician met the case definition for n-hexane-related peripheral neuropathy.

In July 2000, CDHS guidelines were published outlining the diagnosis and management of n-hexane–related peripheral neuropathy (4). The guidelines and notification of the identified cases were distributed to the Association of California Neurologists and to members of the Association of Occupational and Environmental Clinics. The northern California district of the International Association of Machinists and the California Motor Car Dealer Association also were notified.

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Editorial Note: The three cases of peripheral neuropathy described in this report are related to occupational exposure to n-hexane among automotive technicians. Hexanecontaining degreasing products are used in automotive repair facilities and usually are dispensed in an aerosol spray. Inhalation is the primary exposure route. Dermal exposure also may occur, and latex gloves provide ineffective protection from organic solvents. The neurotoxic effects of n-hexane may be intensified when used with other chemicals found in automotive degreasers (e.g., acetone, MEK, and isopropanol) (*5*). Acid-hydrolyzed urinary levels of 2,5-HD, sampled at the end of a shift, correlate with workplace concentrations of n-hexane. Because 2,5-HD has a half-life of 13–14 hours, accumulation may occur during the workweek (*6*).

Chronic n-hexane exposure produces a gradual sensorimotor neuropathy with demyelinating features. The most common initial complaint is numbness and tingling of the toes and fingers; a progressive loss of motor function may develop. Chronic polyneuropathy with demyelinating features also is associated with other underlying conditions. Other causes of peripheral neuropathy should be considered when evaluating persons with possible n-hexane–related peripheral neuropathy. Removal from n-hexane exposure is the only known treatment for n-hexane–related neurotoxicity.

The prognosis for n-hexane neuropathy generally is favorable, but recovery may take months to years, depending on disease severity. The current Occupational Safety and Health Administration permissible exposure limit (PEL) for n-hexane, adopted in

^{*}List generated by Dun and Bradstreet directory (June–August 2000). Standard Industry Code 8011-6107.

n-Hexane-Related Peripheral Neuropathy - Continued

1971, is 500 ppm in air. NIOSH established a recommended PEL of 50 ppm in 1989; the PEL for ACGIH TLV and California are 50 ppm (7).

Other cases of n-hexane–related peripheral neuropathy may be occurring in this industry, but the nature of these exposures and the extent of illness are unknown. The methods used to identify the cases in this report were not intended to represent all automotive repair facilities. An exposure assessment and additional case ascertainment are in progress. Cases of n-hexane–related neuropathy in the automotive repair industry could be prevented through reformulation of hexane-containing products and greater use of aqueous cleaning systems.

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Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity — United States, November 7–13, 2001

The following report summarizes West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance data reported to CDC through ArboNET and verified by states and other jurisdictions as of November 13, 2001.

During the week of November 7–13, three human cases of WNV encephalitis or meningitis were reported from New York (two) and Louisiana (one). During the same period, WNV infections were reported in 266 crows, 15 other birds, and six horses. A total of 17 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported from two jurisdictions (Pennsylvania and District of Columbia).

During 2001, a total of 45 human cases of WNV encephalitis or meningitis has been reported from New York (12), Florida (10), Connecticut (six), Maryland (six), New Jersey (six), Pennsylvania (three), Georgia (one), and Louisiana (one). Among these 45 cases, 24 (53%) were in men; the median age was 70 years (range: 36–90 years); dates of illness onset ranged from July 13 to October 7; three persons died. A total of 4,517 crows and 1,474 other birds with WNV infection was reported from 26 states and the District of Columbia (Figure 1); 176 WNV infections in other animals (all horses) were reported from 14 states (Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia). During 2001, 753 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported from 15 states (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia.

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Additional information about WNV activity is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/index.htm and http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/index.htm and http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/index.htm and http://cindi.usgs.gov/hazard/event/west_nile/west_nile/west_nile/west_nile.htm).




FIGURE 1. Areas reporting West Nile virus (WNV) activity — United States, 2001*

* As of November 13, 2001.

[†] Mississippi reported WNV infection only in a horse.

Notice to Readers

Update: Interim Recommendations for Antimicrobial Prophylaxis for Children and Breastfeeding Mothers and Treatment of Children with Anthrax

Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended for antimicrobial prophylaxis and treatment of adults and children with *Bacillus anthracis* infection associated with the recent bioterrorist attacks in the United States. Amoxicillin is an option for antimicrobial prophylaxis for children and pregnant women and to complete treatment of cutaneous disease when *B. anthracis* is susceptible to penicillin, as is the case in the recent attacks (1-3). Use of ciprofloxacin or doxycycline might be associated with adverse effects in children (4,5), and liquid formulations of these drugs are not widely available. This notice provides further information about prophylaxis and treatment of children and breastfeeding mothers, including the use of amoxicillin.

Ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and penicillin G procaine have been effective as antimicrobial prophylaxis for inhalational *B. anthracis* infection in nonhuman primates and are approved for this use in humans by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (5,6). Amoxicillin has not been studied in animal models and is not approved by FDA for the

Notices to Readers — Continued

prophylaxis or treatment of anthrax. Other data indicate that *B. anthracis* strains produce a cephalosporinase and suggest that the strains contain an inducible beta-lactamase that might decrease the effectiveness of penicillins, especially when a large number of organisms is present (*2*). In addition, penicillin achieves low intracellular concentrations that might be detrimental to its ability to kill germinating spores in macrophages.

Because of these concerns, penicillins (including amoxicillin) are not recommended for initial treatment of anthrax, but are likely to be effective for antimicrobial prophylaxis following exposure to *B. anthracis*, a setting where relatively few organisms are expected to be present. Therefore, amoxicillin* may be used for the 60-day antimicrobial prophylaxis in infants and children when the isolate involved in the exposure is determined to be susceptible to penicillin. Isolates of *B. anthracis* implicated in the recent bioterrorist attacks are susceptible to ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and penicillin (*2*).

Initial treatment of infants and children with inhalational or systemic (including gastrointestinal or oropharyngeal) anthrax should consist of intravenous ciprofloxacin[†] or doxycyline[§], plus one or two additional antimicrobial[¶] agents. If meningitis is suspected, ciprofloxacin might be more effective than doxycycline because of better central nervous system penetration (2). Experience with fluoroquinolones other than ciprofloxacin in children is limited.

Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline should be the initial treatment of localized cutaneous anthrax in infants and children. Intravenous therapy with multiple antimicrobial agents is recommended for cutaneous anthrax with systemic involvement, extensive edema, or lesions on the head or neck (2). Whether infants and young children are at increased risk for systemic dissemination of cutaneous infection is not known; a 7-month-old patient infected during the recent bioterrorism attacks developed systemic illness after onset of cutaneous anthrax (7). For young children (e.g. aged <2 years), initial therapy of cutaneous anthrax should be intravenous, and combination therapy with additional antimicrobials should be considered.

After clinical improvement following intravenous treatment for inhalational or cutaneous anthrax, oral therapy with one or two antimicrobial agents (including either ciprofloxacin or doxycycline) may be used to complete the first 14–21 days of treatment for inhalational anthrax or the first 7–10 days for uncomplicated cutaneous anthrax. The optimal oral treatment regimen is unknown; some adults with inhalational anthrax as a result of the recent bioterrorist attacks are receiving ciprofloxacin and rifampin. For both inhalational and cutaneous anthrax in the setting of this bioterrorist attack, antimicrobial therapy should be continued for 60 days because of the likelihood of exposure to aerosolized *B. anthracis* and the need to protect against persistent spores that might germinate in the respiratory tract. Because of potential adverse effects of prolonged use of ciprofloxacin or doxycycline in children, amoxicillin is an option for completion of the remaining 60 days of therapy for persons infected in these bioterrorist attacks.

^{*}The recommended dose of amoxicillin is 80 mg/kg/day orally divided every 8 hours (maximum 500 mg/dose).

⁺ The recommended dose of ciprofloxacin is 10 mg/kg/dose every 12 hours intravenously (maximum 400 mg/dose) or 15 mg/kg/dose every 12 hours orally (maximum 500 mg/dose).

[§] The recommended dose of doxycycline is 2.2 mg/kg/dose every 12 hours intravenously or orally (maximum 100 mg/dose).

[¶] Options for additional drugs, based on in vitro sensitivity testing of isolates in the recent attacks, include rifampin, vancomycin, penicillin, ampicillin, chloramphenicol, imipenem, clindamycin, and clarithromycin (2).

Notices to Readers — Continued

Because of its known safety for infants, amoxicillin is an option for antimicrobial prophylaxis in breastfeeding mothers when *B. anthracis* is known to be penicillin-susceptible and no contraindication to maternal amoxicillin use is indicated. The American Academy of Pediatrics also considers ciprofloxacin and tetracyclines (which include doxycycline) to be usually compatible with breastfeeding because the amount of either drug absorbed by infants is small, but little is known about the safety of long-term use (*8*). Mothers concerned about the use of ciprofloxacin or doxycycline for antimicrobial prophylaxis should consider expressing and then discarding breast milk so that breastfeeding can be resumed when antimicrobial prophylaxis is completed. Decisions about antimicrobial choice and continuation of breastfeeding should be made by the mother and her and the infant's health-care providers. Consideration should be given to antimicrobial efficacy, safety for the infant, and the benefits of breastfeeding.

Health-care providers prescribing antimicrobial drugs for the prophylaxis or treatment of anthrax should be aware of their adverse effects and consult with an infectious disease specialist as needed. Additional information about recognition, prophylaxis, and treatment of anthrax infection is available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov.

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Notice to Readers

Reducing the Risk for Injury While Traveling for Thanksgiving Holidays

Each year in the United States, motor-vehicle crashes result in approximately 40,000 deaths (1) and 3.2 million nonfatal injuries (2). In 2000 during the Thanksgiving holiday, motor-vehicle crashes killed approximately 500 persons (US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, unpublished data, 2000), and resulted in >43,000 hospital emergency department visits (2). Following are steps that might prevent many of these deaths and injuries:

• Wear safety belts at all times. Safety-belt use is the single most effective means of reducing fatal and nonfatal injuries in motor-vehicle crashes. Although safety belts reduce the risk for death by approximately 45%–60%, three out of 10 U.S. adults do not routinely use them. Effective interventions to increase safety-belt

Notices to Readers — Continued

use include safety-belt laws, primary enforcement laws, and enhanced enforcement programs (3).

- Place children in age appropriate restraints. Infants should be placed in rearfacing child safety seats (CSSs) until they are at least age 1 year and 20–22 lbs. Older children, up to 40 lbs., are safest in forward facing convertible CSSs. Schoolaged children who have outgrown convertible CSSs should be placed in a booster seat until they fit in a car safety belt alone. Effective interventions to increase CSS use include child safety seat use laws, communitywide information plus enhanced enforcement campaigns, CSS distribution plus education programs, and incentive plus education programs that reward parents or children for correctly using CSSs (4).
- Place all children aged <12 years in the back seat. This eliminates the injury risk
 for deployed passenger-side airbags and places the child in the safest part of the
 vehicle in a crash. It is particularly important not to place infants in the front of an
 airbag. Riding in the back seat is associated with at least a 30% reduction in the
 risk for fatal injury (5).
- Never drink and drive. More than 16,000 (73%) traffic deaths each year are associated with alcohol use (6). Effective interventions to reduce alcohol-impaired driving include 0.08% blood alcohol concentration (BAC) laws, lower BAC laws for young or inexperienced drivers, minimum legal drinking age laws, sobriety checkpoints, and server intervention programs that involve face-to-face instruction and management support (7).

Additional information is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc>.

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Notice to Readers

Epidemiology in Action: Intermediate Methods

CDC and Emory University's Rollins School of Public Health will co-sponsor a course, "Epidemiology in Action: Intermediate Methods" during February 25–March 1, 2002, at Emory University. The course is designed for practicing public health professionals who have had training and experience in basic applied epidemiology and would like training in additional quantitative skills related to analysis and interpretation of epidemiologic data.

The course will review the fundamentals of descriptive epidemiology and biostatistics, measures of association, normal and binomial distributions, confounding, statistical tests, stratification, logistic regression, models, and computers as used in epidemiology. Prerequisite is an introductory course in epidemiology, such as Epidemiology in Action, International Course in Applied Epidemiology or any other introductory class. There is a tuition charge.

Deadline for applications is January 15. Additional information and applications are available from Emory University, International Health Dept.(Pia), 1518 Clifton Road, N.E., Room 746, Atlanta, GA 30322; telephone (404) 727-3485; fax (404) 727-4590; or email pvaleri@sph.emory.edu.




FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week totals ending November 10, 2001, with historical data

- * No rubella cases were reported for the current 4-week period yielding a ratio for week 45 of zero (0).
- [†] Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.

		Cum. 2001		Cum. 2001
Anthrax		15	Poliomyelitis, paralytic	-
Brucellosis [†]		75	Psittacosis [†]	19
Cholera		3	Qfever [†]	18
Cyclosporiasis	;†	136	Rabies, human	1
Diphtheria		2	Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF)	525
Ehrlichiosis:	human granulocytic (HGE)†	176	Rubella, congenital syndrome	-
	human monocytic (HME) [†]	76	Streptococcal disease, invasive, group A	3,208
Encephalitis:	California serogroup viral [†]	93	Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome [†]	42
•	eastern equine [†]	8	Syphilis, congenital [¶]	190
	St. Louis [†]	1	Tetanus	22
	western equine [†]	-	Toxic-shock syndrome	101
Hansen diseas	e (leprosy) [†]	73	Trichinosis	21
	Imonary syndrome [†]	7	Tularemia [†]	92
Hemolytic ure	mic syndrome, postdiarrheal [†]	131	Typhoid fever	239
HIV infection,	pediatric ^{†§}	181	Yellow fever	-
Plaque	•	2		

TABLE I. Summary of provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, cumulative, week ending November 10, 2001 (45th Week)*

-: No reported cases. *Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date).

⁵ Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV,

STD, and TB Prevention (NCHSTP). Last updated October 30, 2001. ¹Updated from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, NCHSTP.

		20	Ohlan	6	0		NICT		<i>coli</i> O157:H7	
	All Cum.	Cum.	Chlam Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	ooridiosis Cum.	NET Cum.	Cum.	PH Cum.	Cum.
Reporting Area UNITED STATES	2001 [¶] 33,013	2000 32,692	2001 609,880	2000 599,713	2001 2,971	2000 2,716	2001 2,675	2000 4,065	2001 2,053	2000 3,351
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	1,276 40 31 13 661 85 446	1,673 28 28 29 1,049 81 458	20,251 1,172 1,166 525 8,562 2,555 6,271	20,315 1,273 959 455 8,781 2,314 6,533	113 18 15 31 45 4	127 20 21 26 33 3 24	2,070 211 25 33 13 112 14 14	352 29 34 33 156 19 81	2,000 211 26 27 8 107 11 32	361 28 38 33 162 18 82
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	7,683 823 3,788 1,537 1,535	7,090 665 3,755 1,423 1,247	65,855 12,341 25,456 9,798 18,260	56,071 2,233 22,732 9,051 22,055	235 94 79 10 52	342 112 154 16 60	191 148 12 31 N	404 269 22 113 N	180 136 10 34	321 65 17 113 126
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	2,513 482 306 1,115 459 151	3,164 475 320 1,596 601 172	100,896 21,230 12,924 29,115 25,873 11,754	103,302 26,771 11,547 28,831 21,951 14,202	1,344 149 73 390 165 567	899 249 57 113 87 393	704 186 78 152 84 204	1,002 244 115 186 134 323	473 146 39 128 73 87	702 210 83 150 104 155
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	719 121 78 347 2 23 63 85	762 153 73 349 2 7 64 114	30,862 6,361 3,944 11,089 767 1,571 2,175 4,955	34,075 7,072 4,592 11,595 757 1,586 3,182 5,291	400 168 78 37 13 6 96 2	343 123 73 29 15 15 79 9	494 236 78 51 18 41 52 18	584 155 171 104 15 53 60 26	410 186 60 81 31 41 11	558 178 143 96 21 57 46 17
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	10,366 218 1,529 738 803 73 807 623 1,239 4,336	9,072 182 1,127 694 580 54 585 682 1,049 4,119	115,050 2,309 9,551 2,605 15,401 2,046 17,228 9,638 25,834 30,438	113,571 2,457 12,344 2,779 13,674 1,856 19,231 8,367 24,086 28,777	301 6 36 10 24 2 27 - 127 69	420 6 9 13 17 3 23 - 156 193	203 4 23 - 48 10 46 10 30 32	333 3 32 1 64 14 82 21 37 79	129 7 1 U 39 8 33 11 15 15	269 1 2 U 61 12 66 16 37 74
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	1,554 299 507 378 370	1,618 168 684 418 348	41,956 7,615 12,322 11,939 10,080	44,056 6,928 12,845 13,442 10,841	41 4 12 13 12	45 5 11 15 14	117 57 36 16 8	131 39 52 8 32	99 47 39 6 7	103 31 48 9 15
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	3,488 178 711 203 2,396	3,366 158 587 294 2,327	90,327 6,043 14,824 8,850 60,610	90,911 5,773 15,861 8,128 61,149	33 6 7 13 7	154 14 12 17 111	86 13 4 27 42	219 55 15 19 130	91 - 26 28 37	270 38 46 17 169
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	1,172 15 19 3 248 129 459 101 198	1,211 12 19 9 294 126 386 113 252	34,299 1,542 1,672 7,022 5,202 12,489 1,512 4,147	33,125 1,192 1,582 688 8,910 4,442 10,948 1,951 3,412	214 33 21 7 35 27 7 9 5	164 10 23 5 67 19 10 26 4	260 19 64 85 13 28 30 15	394 30 65 18 151 22 46 49 13	128 - 1 52 10 22 42 1	291 39 10 108 18 37 69 10
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	4,242 435 177 3,552 18 60	4,736 428 145 4,042 22 99	110,384 11,740 6,418 86,648 2,236 3,342	104,287 11,245 5,862 81,922 2,154 3,104	290 54 46 186 1 3	222 U 17 205	409 116 61 211 4 17	646 209 129 265 29 14	332 62 58 203 1 8	476 198 111 151 5 11
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	12 1,021 2 1 -	13 1,133 31 - -	2,193 53 U 111	438 U - U U	- - U -	- - - U U	N 1 - U -	N 6 - U U	U U U U	U U U U U

TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States	έ,
weeks ending November 10, 2001, and November 11, 2000 (45th Week)*	

N: Not notifiable.
U: Unavailable.
·: No reported cases.
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).
Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).
Chlamydia refers to genital infections caused by *C. trachomatis.*Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Last updated October 30, 2001.

	Gono	rrhea	Hepatit Non-A, I	tis C:	Legione		Listeriosis	Lyı Dise	
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000
UNITED STATES	280,825	307,518	2,855	2,753	872	957	395	11,084	14,934
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt.	5,823 118 163 57	5,693 80 95 57	14 - - 6	27 2 - 4	64 8 10 5	52 2 2 5	37 2 4 3	3,607 - 136 14	4,738 - 60 38
Mass. R.I. Conn.	2,705 730 2,050	2,382 561 2,518	8	4 16 5	17 10 14	17 9 17	22 1 5	823 449 2,185	1,119 486 3,035
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	33,798 7,455 10,733 6,831 8,779	33,594 6,379 9,934 6,120 11,161	1,439 52 1,338 49	611 35 - 535 41	170 61 19 8 82	268 81 44 21 122	60 26 9 10 15	5,491 3,170 2 927 1,392	7,803 3,366 173 2,382 1,882
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	52,747 11,818 5,707 16,110 14,803 4,309	61,625 16,469 5,422 18,108 15,561 6,065	149 5 1 13 130	205 11 19 175	247 116 22 - 73 36	245 104 32 28 44 37	51 13 8 1 22 7	606 106 23 21 13 443	757 57 22 34 23 621
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak.	13,159 2,065 1,016 6,906 34 248	15,469 2,754 1,086 7,608 61 258	633 9 - 611 -	517 5 2 499 -	47 9 8 20 1 3	54 7 13 24 - 2	15 - 2 8 - -	356 292 35 24	363 267 31 45 1
Nebr. Kans.	710 2,180	1,285 2,417	4 9	4 7	5 1	4 4	1 4	32	3 16
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va.	71,325 1,398 5,207 2,368 9,210 609	80,382 1,474 8,511 2,264 9,034 562	97 - 16 - - 9	95 2 12 3 3 14	177 12 34 8 20 N	176 9 65 5 31 N	65 - 13 - 12	771 49 496 14 115 11	1,028 167 602 7 137
N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	14,468 6,422 14,223 17,420	15,750 7,390 15,648 19,749	9 19 6 1 46	14 16 3 3 39	9 11 10 73	15 4 7 40	5 5 11 14	38 5 - 43	29 43 9 - 34
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	27,210 3,045 8,279 9,257 6,629	31,745 3,064 10,240 10,416 8,025	170 8 58 4 100	407 33 88 10 276	50 11 25 12 2	36 19 10 4 3	19 5 8 6	55 22 24 8 1	47 11 28 5 3
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	44,045 3,646 10,127 4,045 26,227	48,059 3,404 11,709 3,620 29,326	173 4 85 3 81	663 8 406 8 241	5 - 2 3 -	22 - 7 3 12	18 1 - 2 15	81 - 2 - 79	82 5 7 - 70
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo.	8,542 86 68 72	9,114 42 73 41	61 1 2 8	66 4 3 2	50 - 3 1	37 1 5	32 - 1 1	12 - 5 1	12 - 2 3
Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	2,412 877 3,378 119 1,530	2,807 979 3,650 187 1,335	19 11 9 3 8	12 13 18 1 13	14 3 19 6 4	13 1 7 10	7 7 2 7	2 - 1 1 2	- - 3 4
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	24,176 2,608 993 19,708 358 509	21,837 1,997 844 18,286 301 409	119 20 12 87 -	162 29 25 106 - 2	62 9 N 49 - 4	67 16 N 50 1	98 10 8 74 - 6	105 8 87 2 N	104 9 12 81 2 N
Guam P.R. V.I.	- 531 6	47 445 -	- 1 -	3 1 -	2	- 1 -	-	N -	Ň
Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	Ŭ 13	U U	U -	U U	U -	U U	-	U -	U U

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States,weeks ending November 10, 2001, and November 11, 2000 (45th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. - : No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

			-		Salmor	Salmonellosis [†]				
	Ma	aria	Rabies	, Animal	NET	T		LIS		
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000		
UNITED STATES	1,049	1,296	5,791	6,220	31,723	34,223	26,250	28,702		
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	70 4 2 1 31 9 23	68 6 1 3 31 8 19	650 63 20 58 237 64 208	735 121 21 55 243 52 243	2,132 159 159 72 1,182 123 437	1,963 112 128 102 1,130 123 368	2,006 150 144 63 1,055 163 431	1,995 88 133 97 1,137 137 403		
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	265 59 138 34 34	344 68 196 46 34	1,073 702 24 173 174	1,170 736 17 175 242	3,658 1,088 959 652 959	4,459 1,086 1,082 1,037 1,254	3,483 1,213 1,192 657 421	4,723 1,156 1,176 910 1,481		
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	128 21 16 33 38 20	128 18 60 30 14	132 42 15 24 45 6	149 49 - 22 67 11	4,256 1,140 476 1,177 718 745	4,693 1,285 573 1,364 782 689	3,738 1,062 439 1,049 734 454	3,204 1,294 550 159 850 351		
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	31 6 12 - 2 5	61 27 2 15 2 1 8 6	314 43 73 40 35 42 4 77	491 79 70 50 107 88 2 95	2,050 582 321 582 56 141 128 240	2,132 482 323 639 55 88 200 345	2,173 609 297 863 77 118 209	2,303 616 317 784 72 96 137 281		
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	266 2 108 13 45 1 17 6 30 44	300 5 105 49 4 33 2 26 61	2,006 30 324 - 423 131 517 104 311 166	2,121 49 363 - 507 107 512 142 302 139	7,765 80 728 72 1,199 1,186 782 1,532 2,067	7,145 106 709 57 902 144 991 666 1,333 2,237	5,394 98 802 U 958 125 1,083 660 1,210 458	5,316 116 629 U 842 137 1,024 508 1,568 492		
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	33 12 11 6 4	44 18 11 14 1	188 26 99 61 2	191 19 97 74 1	2,371 333 569 679 790	2,144 340 574 594 636	1,679 214 720 474 271	1,624 236 724 547 117		
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	12 3 5 3 1	67 3 11 8 45	877 20 1 57 799	816 20 4 52 740	3,334 806 332 419 1,777	4,424 647 789 344 2,644	2,537 92 952 375 1,118	2,709 532 666 268 1,243		
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	51 3 - 20 3 10 4 8	45 1 21 - 8 6 6	229 36 28 20 - 14 115 15 15 1	254 62 9 52 19 93 10 9	1,914 68 127 53 532 254 551 195 134	2,425 82 107 61 639 211 636 446 243	1,574 4 52 544 215 547 189 23	2,275 100 54 622 190 688 441 180		
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	193 9 12 162 1 9	239 29 36 164 10	322 3 282 37	293 7 259 27	4,243 463 214 3,206 37 323	4,838 503 267 3,805 53 210	3,666 491 291 2,526 28 330	4,553 601 327 3,374 33 218		
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa	- 4 U	2 5 - U	83 - U	71 - U	510 U	24 597 - U				
C.N.M.I.	-	U	-	U	14	U	U	U		

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States,weeks ending November 10, 2001, and November 11, 2000 (45th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

[†] Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

Ī	benang	Shigel	philis		-1			
	NET			ILIS	(Primary 8	Secondary)		culosis
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000
UNITED STATES	15,488	19,606	7,128	11,236	5,012	5,299	10,539	12,186
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	232 6 7 181 17 15	370 10 6 4 256 30 64	255 2 3 5 176 24 45	347 11 233 30 65	53 1 2 30 9 10	75 1 2 53 4 15	355 8 16 4 203 32 92	363 16 18 4 208 27 90
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	1,130 441 321 185 183	2,321 683 883 479 276	693 113 331 184 65	1,520 209 599 412 300	438 22 237 119 60	244 9 102 62 71	2,001 310 1,010 433 248	1,945 264 1,045 470 166
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	3,786 2,589 198 457 277 265	3,767 346 1,431 1,081 609 300	1,643 1,086 40 288 202 27	1,127 283 146 93 552 53	886 71 145 299 348 23	1,078 64 314 363 294 43	1,142 230 88 527 228 69	1,229 243 122 590 200 74
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	1,726 388 344 292 21 543 72 66	2,212 714 486 609 42 7 132 222	1,175 384 286 196 28 246 - 35	1,842 806 322 431 49 4 110 120	80 27 4 21 - 5 23	60 15 11 26 - 2 6	393 199 34 113 3 12 32	439 134 33 161 2 16 22 71
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	2,199 14 138 51 338 8 312 235 366 737	2,650 22 182 67 414 4 345 123 237 1,256	720 11 87 U 175 8 156 119 130 34	1,047 21 102 328 3 244 84 168 97	1,709 9 205 32 92 4 398 204 325 440	1,768 8 266 35 119 3 435 203 342 357	2,180 15 182 51 215 26 291 153 409 838	2,449 14 214 27 232 27 302 238 532 863
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	1,421 651 90 189 491	1,028 433 328 77 190	540 285 96 130 29	525 104 354 61 6	565 43 278 118 126	775 74 464 109 128	701 103 253 235 110	798 106 302 259 131
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	2,009 506 128 71 1,304	3,089 184 258 107 2,540	1,146 155 166 36 789	1,006 55 166 41 744	626 31 141 59 395	725 94 192 108 331	763 129 - 122 512	1,768 162 146 130 1,330
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	865 8 39 215 113 368 53 66	1,081 7 44 5 236 151 448 74 116	627 - 5 243 75 248 48 8	785 25 3 195 105 312 79 66	211 - 1 36 17 140 8 8	209 - 1 8 16 177 1 5	422 6 3 102 24 194 33 52	441 14 8 72 38 181 41 84
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	2,120 186 77 1,793 6 58	3,088 412 154 2,482 7 33	329 167 100 - 6 56	3,037 380 103 2,522 3 29	444 42 13 379 10	365 60 11 293 - 1	2,582 207 91 2,113 43 128	2,754 217 86 2,242 92 117
Guam P.R.	- 8	36 33	U U	U U	- 240	3 141	- 76	47 135
V.I. Amer. Samoa <u>C.N.M.I.</u>	U 7	- U U	U U U	U U U	- U 10	- U U	- U 31	- U U

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending November 10, 2001, and November 11, 2000 (45th Week)*

N: Not notifiable.
U: Unavailable.
I: No reported cases.
Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).
Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

	Hepatitis (Viral), By Type Measles (Rubeola)											
		isive	A		B		Indige	nous	- 7	orted [†]	Total	
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001 [§]	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000
UNITED STATES	1,102	1,118	8,780	11,460	5,677	6,110	-	49	-	44	93	73
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H.	81 2 4	94 1 12	559 10 16	346 19 18	88 5 14	96 5 15	- - -	4 - -	- - -	1 - -	5 - -	6 - 3
Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	3 37 5 30	7 37 4 33	14 247 59 213	10 124 22 153	4 9 25 31	6 13 19 38	- - -	1 2 - 1	- - -	- 1 -	1 3 - 1	3 - - -
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	167 66 41 40 20	201 86 54 36 25	834 229 262 159 184	1,349 222 463 255 409	885 113 379 169 224	1,034 119 502 160 253	- - - -	5 1 3 - 1	- - - -	11 4 1 1 5	16 5 4 1 6	21 10 10 - 1
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	139 52 43 10 12 22	161 49 27 56 9 20	1,008 186 92 381 291 58	1,483 234 105 635 434 75	787 84 45 134 524	640 93 42 108 359 38				10 3 4 3 -	10 3 4 3 -	7 2 - 3 2 -
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo.	58 36 13	65 35 20	374 39 34 102	606 167 62 244	187 21 24 101	255 34 31 125		4 2 - 2		1 1 -	5 3 - 2	2 1 - -
N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	7 - 1 1	2 1 3 4	3 3 30 163	3 2 30 98	1 1 <u>22</u> 17	2 1 38 24	U - -	- - -	U - -	-	-	- - 1
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md.	328 - 76	246 - 74	2,104 - 248	1,287 15 182	1,320 - 129	1,109 14 112	- -	4 - 2	- -	1 - 1	5 - 3	4 - -
D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga.	27 14 44 6 88	36 8 23 7 61	47 115 18 202 66 856	24 142 53 127 72 269	11 157 20 173 28 442	29 145 14 213 21 204		- 1 - - 1			- 1 - - 1	2 - - -
Fla. E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	73 67 2 37 26 2	37 42 12 18 10 2	552 351 118 141 68 24	403 363 47 128 47 141	360 371 40 202 75 54	357 405 67 189 51 98		- 2 - -			- 2 - -	2
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	44 1 6 36 1	61 2 16 41 2	1,159 62 56 107 934	2,138 125 82 227 1,704	605 85 41 70 409	985 88 138 140 619	- U - -	- - - -	- U - -	1 - - 1	1 - - 1	- - -
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo.	124 - 2 - 32	111 1 4 1 27	656 11 54 7 80	809 7 29 4 183	436 3 11 2 96	457 6 6 3 88	U - -	1 - -	U - -	1 - 1 -	2 - 1 -	12 - - 2
N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	32 20 54 6 10	22 41 11 4	36 352 64 52	67 395 52 72	126 130 26 42	121 170 20 43	- - -	- 1 -	- - -		- 1 -	- - 3 7
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	94 5 18 43 6 22	137 6 31 34 43 23	1,735 134 68 1,516 14 3	3,079 256 156 2,641 13 13	998 127 95 751 9 16	1,129 96 103 909 10 11	- - - U	29 13 4 10 - 2	- - - U	18 2 - 11 5	47 15 4 21 - 7	21 3 - 14 1 3
Guam P.R. V.I.	- 1 -	1 4	119	1 228	173	10 255	U Ū	- -	U - U	-	- -	2
Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I. N: Not potifiable	U -	U U Jnavailable	U -	UUU	U 32 orted case	U U	Ŭ U	U -	Ŭ U	U -	U -	U U

TABLE III. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending November 10, 2001, and November 11, 2000 (45th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. - : No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date). [†] For imported measles, cases include only those resulting from importation from other countries. [§] Of 240 cases among children aged <5 years, serotype was reported for 117, and of those, 20 were type b.

		jococcal ease	Nover	Mumps	1, 2000	(4511	Pertussis		Rubella			
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	
UNITED STATES	1,871	1,909	1	191	284	30	4,035	6,068	-	21	165	
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	98 4 13 5 50 4 22	116 8 12 3 66 9 18			4 - - 1 1 2		366 21 28 28 267 5 17	1,584 41 117 216 1,150 18 42	- - - -		12 - - 8 1 1	
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	186 55 34 43 54	223 64 39 46 74	- - - -	20 3 10 3 4	25 10 6 3 6	3 3 - -	259 127 44 18 70	619 302 78 30 209	- - - -	5 1 3 1	9 1 8 - -	
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	223 67 35 22 57 42	342 80 38 77 105 42		18 1 3 11 3	22 7 1 6 2	1 - - 1 -	556 219 78 67 125 67	711 309 93 103 91 115	- - - -	3 - 1 2 - -	1 - 1 - -	
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr.	134 20 28 47 6 5 14	136 20 32 61 2 5 7	- - - U -	7 3 - - 1	17 7 4 1 - 2	3 - 2 U -	297 146 26 92 4 4 4	514 314 48 74 6 7 26	- - - U -	3 - 1 - -	2 1 - - 1	
Kans. S. ATLANTIC Del. Md.	14 338 4 38	9 260 1 26	- - -	3 36 - 6	3 41 9	1 6 - 1	21 230 33	39 443 8 111		1 7 1 -	- 112 1 -	
D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	37 12 61 33 46 107	- 38 13 36 21 43 82		- 8 - 5 5 7 5	9 7 10 2 4	- - 5 - - -	1 41 3 68 31 27 26	3 98 1 98 28 38 58		- - 2 1 3	- 82 27 - 2	
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	121 20 56 30 15	125 26 53 33 13	- - - -	9 3 1 5	5 1 2 2	- - -	129 35 55 35 4	105 52 32 18 3	- - -		6 1 1 4 -	
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	282 18 61 27 176	203 12 43 26 122	1 U - 1	12 1 2 - 9	29 1 5 - 23	1 U - 1	422 43 2 18 359	343 34 19 47 243	U - -	1 - - 1	8 1 - 6	
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah	82 4 7 5 30 10 13 7	82 4 7 30 9 22 7	- - - - - -	11 1 1 2 1 1	19 - 1 - 1 4 6	7 U 1 - 4 2 -	1,173 35 170 1 242 135 498 74	697 35 57 4 410 85 70 24	- U - - - -	1 - - 1 - - -	2 - - 1 - 1 -	
Nev. PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	6 407 60 40 292 2 13	3 422 51 62 293 8 8 8	- N U	3 78 2 N 39 1 36	6 122 9 N 85 8 20	9 6 3 U	18 603 142 48 374 8 31	12 1,052 359 106 528 21 38	- - - - U	- 1 - - - 1	- 13 7 - 6 -	
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa <u>C.N.M.I.</u>	4 - U -	9 - U U	U - U U U	- - - U -	14 - - U U	U - U U U	2 - U	4 9 - U U	U - U U U	- - - U	1 - - U U	

TABLE III. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending November 10, 2001, and November 11, 2000 (45th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. - : No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

				Nov	/emb	ber	10, 2	2001 (45th W	eek)						
		All Cau	ises, By	Age (Y	ears)		P&I⁺			All Cau	uses, By	Age (Y	'ears)		P&I⁺
Reporting Area	All Ages	≥ 65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total	Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total
NEW ENGLAND Boston, Mass. Bridgeport, Conn Cambridge, Mass Fall River, Mass. Hartford, Conn. Lowell, Mass. Lynn, Mass. New Bedford, Ma New Haven, Conn Providence, R.I. Somerville, Mass Springfield, Mass Waterbury, Conn. Worcester, Mass. MID. ATLANTIC Albany, N.Y.	. 17 U 46 19 10 ss. 29 . 35 . 33 56 2,292 52	382 77 41 15 U 285 8 25 29 37 6 26 23 42 1,483 32	97 38 6 1 - 10 4 - 2 4 13 - 5 5 9 454 14	38 15 4 1 0 6 - 1 2 1 1 1 4 279 4	8 3 - - 1 - 2 1 - 1 49 -	7 3 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 24 2	8 1152 132 133 133 133 133	S. ATLANTIC Atlanta, Ga. Baltimore, Md. Charlotte, N.C. Jacksonville, Fla. Miami, Fla. Norfolk, Va. Richmond, Va. Savannah, Ga. St. Petersburg, F Tampa, Fla. Washington, D.C. Wilmington, Del E.S. CENTRAL Birmingham, Ala Chattanooga, Te Knoxville, Tenn.	U 53 58 36 1a. 45 200 2. 100 . 10 . 10 863 a. 168 nn. 67 99	666 84 122 76 77 U 29 33 29 28 130 59 2 573 104 46 77	271 42 52 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	102 15 26 8 10 0 6 7 3 3 14 10 - 72 11 5 6	36 3 5 3 U 3 2 7 - 24 7 3 -	23 5 8 1 U 5 - 1 13 2 1	72 326 15 9 U 2 - 3 2 11 1 - 55 12 5 2
Allentown, Pa. Buffalo, N.Y. Camden, N.J. Elizabeth, N.J. Erie, Pa.§ Jersey City, N.J. New York City, N.Y. Newark, N.J. Paterson, N.J. Philadelphia, Pa. Phitsburgh, Pa.§ Reading, Pa. Rochester, N.Y. Schenectady, N.Y. Scranton, Pa.§ Syracuse, N.Y. Trenton, N.J. Utica, N.Y. Yonkers, N.Y.	17 69 17 46 53 Y. 1,388 U 17 233 38 24 120	14 54 11 27 34 825 U 9 1628 19 85 17 27 22 19 U	. 2 7 5 2 6 11 302 U 5 43 7 2 23 5 2 9 5 4 U	1 4 1 2 2 17 2 17 3 3 9 2 - 6 3 1 U	2 1 2 32 U 6 - 2 1 3 - 2 1 - 3 - - U	- 2 - 1 9 U 3 4 - 1 - 2 - U U	2 4 1 - 7 - 82 U 1 20 4 1 8 4 9 12 9 3 U	Lexington, Ky. Memphis, Tenn. Mobile, Ala. Montgomery, Al Nashville, Tenn. W.S. CENTRAL Austin, Tex. Baton Rouge, La Corpus Christi, 1 Dallas, Tex. El Paso, Tex. Ft. Worth, Tex. Little Rock, Ark. New Orleans, La. San Antonio, Te: Shreveport, La. Tulsa, Okla.	81 173 98 a. 35 142 1,419 89 431 206 406 126 406 71 U9 x. 189 57 116	54 105 68 95 956 51 38 37 133 51 936 46 U 138 35 88 600	18 38 17 8 28 275 26 2 6 40 22 96 10 22 96 15 0 30 11 17	6 23 6 3 12 109 7 2 2 9 1 6 43 6 U 11 5 7	2 3 5 4 39 3 - 10 2 2 10 1 U 3 3 4	1 4 2 - 3 38 2 1 5 4 1 3 11 2 U 6 3 -	9 11 3 11 80 4 2 6 13 1 7 18 3 U 12 6 8
E.N. CENTRAL Akron, Ohio Canton, Ohio Chicago, III. Cincinnati, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio Columbus, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Detroit, Mich. Evansville, Ind. Fort Wayne, Ind. Garad Rapids, Mi Indianapolis, Ind. Lansing, Mich. Milwaukee, Wis. Peoria, III. Rockford, III. South Bend, Ind. Toledo, Ohio Youngstown, Ohi W.N. CENTRAL Des Moines, Iowa Duluth, Minn. Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Mo. Lincoln, Nebr. Minneapolis, Min Omaha, Nebr. St. Louis, Mo. St. Paul, Minn. Wichita, Kans.	226 40 105 51 55 99 106 0 52 644 1 U . 38 94 44	$\begin{array}{c} 1,045\\ 361\\ 361\\ 094\\ 1237\\ 3812\\ 2252\\ 15235\\ 785\\ 434\\ 67\\ 39\\ 445\\ 0\\ 0\\ 268\\ 30\\ 127\\ 54\\ 0\\ 75\\ 126\\ 127\\ 54\\ 0\\ 75\\ 126\\ 127\\ 54\\ 0\\ 75\\ 126\\ 127\\ 126\\ 126\\ 126\\ 126\\ 126\\ 126\\ 126\\ 126$	$\begin{array}{c} 305 \\ 6 \\ 5 \\ 0 \\ 19 \\ 27 \\ 0 \\ 27 \\ 50 \\ 11 \\ 10 \\ 4 \\ 10 \\ 50 \\ 32 \\ 13 \\ 7 \\ 9 \\ 23 \\ 8 \\ 126 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 7 \\ 17 \\ 9 \\ 306 \\ 23 \\ 0 \\ 24 \\ 0 \\ 24 \\ \end{array}$	84 4 1 U 1 10 U 4 18 2 2 3 2 15 1 5 2 4 2 5 3 45 U U 5 8 4 7 5 11 U 5	43 4 4 U 3 2 U 3 6 1 1 1 2 6 1 1 1 - 1 4 2 21 U U 1 3 1 6 4 4 U 2	37 2 - U 10 2 U 3 5 1 6 3 1 1 3 - 7 U U - 3 - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 2 1 U - 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1	103 5 9 U 11 6 U 8 9 1 3 2 2 2 2 6 2 8 6 8 3 9 U U 1 17 4 17 4 1 U 5	MOUNTAIN Albuquerque, N Boise, Idaho Colo. Springs, C Denver, Colo. Las Vegas, Nev. Ogden, Utah Phoenix, Ariz. Pueblo, Colo. Salt Lake City, U Tucson, Ariz. PACIFIC Berkeley, Calif. Fresno, Calif. Glendale, Calif. Honolulu, Hawa Long Beach, Calif. Bortland, Oreg. Sacramento, Cal San Diego, Calif. San Francisco, C San Jose, Calif. Santa Cruz, Calif Santa Cruz, Calif Santa Cruz, Calif Santa Cruz, Calif Santa Cruz, Calif Santa Cruz, Calif. Santa Cruz, Calif.	48 olo. 42 117 211 30 U 228 tah 141 1,543 1,543 1,543 1,543 1,543 1,550 f. 80 f. 80 if. 420 if. 420 if. 152 alif. U U	84 39 22 80 140 19 94 103 1,115 56 294 241 113 115 115 115 115 115 115 11	$\begin{array}{c} 163\\ 22\\ 5\\ 11\\ 19\\ 46\\ 0\\ 6\\ 29\\ 21\\ 279\\ 5\\ 24\\ 4\\ 7\\ 7\\ 17\\ 86\\ 6\\ 28\\ 366\\ 24\\ 0\\ 0\\ 1\\ 16\\ 14\\ 2\\ 2,148\\ \end{array}$	71 12 4 8 9 16 2 U 3 10 7 99 4 11 12 27 17 15 8 U U 10 2 8 9 10 2 8 9 10 2 10 7 99 4 11 1 2 27 17 15 8 U U 10 2 8 9 10 2 8 9 10 2 8 9 10 7 9 10 7 9 10 7 9 10 7 10 2 7 17 15 8 U U 10 2 8 9 10 2 8 9 10 10 2 8 9 10 10 2 8 10 10 10 2 8 9 10 10 10 2 8 10 10 2 8 9 10 10 2 8 10 10 10 2 8 10 10 2 8 10 10 2 8 9 10 10 2 8 9 10 10 2 8 9 9 10 10 2 8 9 9 10 10 10 2 8 9 9 10 10 10 2 8 9 9 10 10 10 2 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	19 3 1 4 3 1 U - 4 3 - 2 4 3 - 2 4 3 - 2 4 3 - 2 4 3 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 4 - 2 - - 2 - 2 - - 2 - 2 - - 2 - - 2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - -	22 1 5 8 2 U - 4 2 25 - 2 3 8 - 1 2 2 2 U U - 2 2 3 196	64 8 3 - 11 6 - U 2 15 9 120 1 2 15 9 120 1 2 9 5 5 722

TABLE IV. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending November 10, 2001 (45th Week)

U: Unavailable. -:No reported cases. * Mortality data in this table are reported voluntarily from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of ≥100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included. [†] Pneumonia and influenza. [§] Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks. [¶] Total includes unknown ages.

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