

MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY

WEEKLY REPORT

- 1049 Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax — Connecticut, 2001
 1051 Update: Adverse Events Associated with
- Anthrax Prophylaxis Among Postal Employees — New Jersey, New York, and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Area, 2001 HIV Testing Among Racial/Ethnic Minorities
- United Štates, 1999
 Simultaneous Administration of Varicella Vaccine and Other Recommended Childhood Vaccines – United States, 1995–1999
 Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity –
- 1061 Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity United States, November 14–20, 2001
 1062 Notices to Beaders

62 Notices to Readers

Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax — Connecticut, 2001

Since October 3, 2001, CDC and state and local public health authorities have been investigating cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax (1–5). As of November 28, a total of 23 cases have been identified; 11 were confirmed as inhalational anthrax, and 12 (seven confirmed and five suspected) were cutaneous. Epidemiologic investigations to identify the source of exposure to *Bacillus anthracis* continue for a case of inhalational anthrax in a hospital stockroom worker in New York City (NYC) and, most recently, a case of inhalational anthrax is continuing in persons exposed to *B. anthracis*, and surveillance to detect new cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax is ongoing. This report summarizes the findings of the case investigation in CT.

On November 16, a 94-year-old woman who resided in Oxford, CT (2000 population: 9821), presented to a local hospital with fever, cough, weakness, and muscle aches of approximately 3 days' duration. She had no history of chills, headache, rhinorrhea, vomiting, diarrhea, or abdominal or chest pain. She had a medical history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension, and renal insufficiency. On admission, the patient had a temperature of 102.3 F (39.1 C) with an elevated heart rate and room air oxygen saturation of 93%. Physical examination was otherwise unremarkable. Initial chest radiograph had no evidence of pulmonary infiltrate, pleural effusion, or widened mediastinum. Her white blood cell count was 8,100 cells/mm³ (78% neutrophils, 15% lymphocytes). Hematocrit, platelet count, and electrolytes were normal. Blood and urine cultures were obtained and the patient was admitted for dehydration and possible urinary tract infection.

On November 17, gram positive rods were noted on microscopic evaluation of the blood culture and gram negative rods were isolated from the urine. Antibiotic therapy was initiated for possible sepsis with vancomycin and ceftazidime, and changed to ampicillin/sulbactam and oral ciprofloxicin later that day. On November 18, the patient had progressive respiratory distress and confusion. Repeat chest radiograph revealed a left-sided pleural effusion and possible infiltrate but no mediastinal widening. A chest CT was not performed. Thoracentesis performed the following day obtained 800 ml of sero-sanguinous fluid with 4,224 red blood cells and 1,463 white blood cells. On November 19, the patient was transferred to the intensive care unit and required mechanical ventilation and vasopressor support. Clindamycin was added to her antibiotic regimen, and ciprofloxicin was changed to intravenous administration. The patient's condition deteriorated, and she died on November 21.

Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax — Continued

On November 19, the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CDPH) was notified by the hospital of the positive blood culture results. On November 20, the isolate was identified as *B. anthracis* at the CDPH laboratory with confirmation at CDC the following day. The *B. anthracis* isolate was indistinguishable by molecular typing and antibiotic susceptibility patterns when compared with the strain from recently identified cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax. An autopsy revealed hemorrhagic mediastinal lymphadenitis with positive immunohistochemical staining for *B. anthracis* on spleen and mediastinal lymph node tissue.

The patient lived alone in a rural area of CT and was home-bound except when provided transportation by friends and family. Interviews with family members and others were conducted to construct a time line of the patient's activities during the 60-day period preceding her illness. The time line was used to guide environmental sample collection. As of November 27, none of the environmental samples from the patient's home, local businesses, and other areas that she frequented has yielded *B. anthracis*. In addition, nasal swabs from friends and relatives who may have had common exposures with the patient were negative for *B. anthracis*. These persons were started on ciprofloxicin or doxycycline for postexposure prophylaxis. The decision whether or not a full 60-day course is necessary will be made after further investigation into the potential source of exposure.

On November 20, environmental testing was conducted at the local post office and regional mail distribution facility involved in delivery of the patient's mail. In addition, sampling was performed on mail recovered from the patient's home, area mailboxes, and the mail carrier vehicle. As of November 27, none of the samples have yielded *B. anthracis.* Nasal swabs also were taken from 460 postal employees in the two facilities; all are negative for *B. anthracis.* Mail flow investigations have identified several letters that were delivered to the area serviced by the patient's local post office and that had previously passed through the mail facility in Trenton, NJ, shortly after the *B. anthracis* contaminated letters addressed to two U.S. Senators. However, no such letters are known to have been received by this patient. On November 21, approximately 900 postal employees at two facilities in CT were started on either ciprofloxicin or doxycycline, pending the results of further investigation.

Surveillance for new and possibly undiagnosed anthrax cases is being intensified by contacting hospitals, laboratories, physicians, and by reviewing death certificates. Environmental and case investigations to identify a source of *B. anthracis* exposure are ongoing.

Reported by: H Quentzel, MD, S Spear, MD, L Barakat, MD, Griffin Hospital; N Lustig, MPH, Pomperaug Health District, Oxford; K Spargo, MPH, Naugatuck Valley Health District, Shelton; M Cartter, MD, J Garcia, MD, DM Barden, MT (HHS), DR Mayo, ScD, KA Kelley, DrPH, J Hadler, MD, State Epidemiologist, Connecticut Dept of Public Health. EIS officers, CDC.

Editorial Note: The source of exposure to *B. anthracis* for the 94-year-old CT resident remains unknown. The genetic characteristics of *B. anthracis* isolated from this patient links this case with the previous bioterrorism-related cases of anthrax. However, this patient differed from most previously identified cases in both epidemiologic characteristics and potential sources of exposure. The patient in CT had limited activity outside her home, had not visited a media company or postal facility, and had an onset of symptoms at least 3 weeks later than previously reported patients. In addition, one notable clinical finding was the absence of a pulmonary infiltrate, pleural effusion, or mediastinal widening on the admission chest radiograph.

Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax — Continued

Epidemiologic findings indicate that recent cases of inhalational anthrax most likely occurred from aerosols generated from opening a letter containing *B. anthracis* powder or from aerosols generated in processing a sealed letter containing *B. anthracis* powder at a postal facility. The most recent case in CT and a case of inhalational anthrax in the 61-year-old hospital stockroom worker in NYC did not have either exposure identified. Possible sources of *B. anthracis* under investigation include exposures inside and outside the home and mail that passed through contaminated mail facilities. The investigation by public health and law enforcement authorities to find the source of exposure continues and surveillance for new cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax is ongoing.

Clinicians and laboratorians should remain alert for symptoms or findings that might indicate anthrax (6). Information on anthrax is available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov.

References

- 1. CDC. Update: investigation of anthrax associated with intentional exposure and interim public health guidelines, October 2001. MMWR 2001;50:889–93.
- 2. CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax and interim guidelines for exposure management and antimicrobial therapy, October 2001. MMWR 2001;50:909–19.
- CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax and interim guidelines for clinical evaluation of persons with possible anthrax. MMWR 2001;50:941–8.
- CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax and adverse events from antimicrobial prophylaxis. MMWR 2001;50:973-6.
- 5. CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax, 2001. MMWR 2001;50:1008–10.
- Jernigan JA, Stephens DS, Ashford, DA, et al. Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax: the first 10 cases reported in the United States. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/ vol7no6/jernigan.htm. Accessed November 2001.

Update: Adverse Events Associated with Anthrax Prophylaxis Among Postal Employees — New Jersey, New York City, and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Area, 2001

Antimicrobial prophylaxis to prevent inhalational anthrax has been recommended for persons potentially exposed to *Bacillus anthracis* as a result of the recent bioterrorist attacks (1). During October 26–November 6, 2001, an epidemiologic evaluation to detect adverse events associated with antimicrobial prophylaxis was conducted among 8,424 postal employees who had been offered antimicrobial prophylaxis for 60 days in New Jersey (NJ), New York City (NYC), and one postal facility in the District of Columbia (DC). This report summarizes preliminary results of that evaluation, which found that few employees receiving antimicrobial prophylaxis sought medical attention for symptoms that may have been associated with anaphylaxis. Persons with exposures to *B. anthracis* related to the bioterrorist attacks should complete the full 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis.

In NJ, NYC, and DC, a questionnaire was administered on days 7 to 10 after postal employees received prophylaxis (when they returned for medication refills). In NYC and DC, the questionnaire was self-administered by postal employees; in NJ, nurses interviewed postal workers and administered the questionnaire. Information was collected about the type of antimicrobial used, the occurrence of adverse events, medical attention sought for adverse events related to antimicrobial prophylaxis, and discontinuation of prophylaxis. Persons who reported hospitalization or sought medical attention for symptoms that may have been associated with anaphylaxis (i.e., difficulty breathing;

Adverse Events — Continued

throat tightness and difficulty swallowing; swelling of lips, tongue, or face; and rash, hives, and itchy skin) are being followed up closely by contacting patients and clinicians to confirm or exclude possible hospitalizations and life-threatening adverse events.

Of the 8,424 postal employees offered antimicrobial prophylaxis, 5,819 (69%) completed or were administered the questionnaire to evaluate the occurrence of adverse events. A total of 3,863 (66%) had initiated antimicrobial prophylaxis*; of these, 3,428 (89%) reported using ciprofloxacin for antimicrobial prophylaxis; 435 (11%) used other antimicrobials (when ciprofloxacin was contraindicated), including doxycycline (6%) and amoxicillin (1%) (Table 1). Of the 3,428 persons on ciprofloxacin, 666 (19%) reported severe nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, or abdominal pain; 484 (14%) reported fainting, light-headedness, or dizziness; 250 (7%) reported heartburn or acid reflux; and 216 (6%) reported rashes, hives, or itchy skin. Of those persons taking ciprofloxacin, 287 (8%) discontinued the medication; 116 (3%) discontinued the medication because of adverse events, 27 (1%) discontinued because of fear of possible adverse events, and 28 (1%) stopped taking the drug because they "did not think it was needed." For the 3,863 persons on any medication for antimicrobial prophylaxis, 83 (2%) sought medical attention for symptoms that may have been associated with anaphylaxis. Among the 33 persons who sought medical attention for these symptoms in NJ and NYC, none was hospitalized and none of the symptoms was attributed to antimicrobial prophylaxis by clinicians who evaluated these persons. Follow-up of persons in DC who sought medical attention for symptoms that may have been associated with anaphylaxis is ongoing.

Reported by: R Brechner, MD, State Epidemiologist, Maryland Dept of Health and Hygiene. G DiFerdinando, MD, E Bresnitz, MD, State Epidemiologist, New Jersey Dept of Health and Senior Svcs. New York City Dept of Health; SH Factor, MD, TD Matte, MD, Center for Urban Epidemiologic Studies, New York Academy of Medicine, New York. L Siegel, MD, S Adams, I Walks, MD, J Davies-Coles, PhD, M Richardson, MD, District of Columbia Dept of Health. E Peterson, MD, R Stroube, MD, State Epidemiologist, Virginia Dept of Health. National Center for Infectious Diseases; and EIS officers, CDC.

Editorial Note: Among persons with exposures to *B. anthracis* related to the recent bioterrorist attacks, completion of a full 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis is essential for preventing anthrax (1). Activities to promote adherence among postal employees in NJ, NYC, and DC include messages (e.g., posters at the worksite) to promote adherence, small group discussions with postal employees to identify and resolve barriers to adherence, and reminder devices (e.g., pocket calendars). In addition, a key component of promoting adherence is monitoring adverse events that might deter patients from taking antimicrobial prophylaxis. Information from these monitoring systems can be used to reassure workers of antimicrobial prophylaxis and to guide management of workers with potentially serious adverse events.

Although adverse events were commonly reported by postal employees who participated in this evaluation and included gastrointestinal and dermatologic reactions, only 2% of persons surveyed sought medical care for symptoms that may have been associated with anaphylaxis. Overall rates of adverse events (regardless of attributability) in NJ, NYC, and DC are similar to the frequency of adverse events among other persons on antimicrobial prophylaxis for exposures to *B. anthracis* related to these bioterrorist attacks (*2*) and among persons on ciprofloxacin therapy for any indication (*3*,*4*). The

^{*}The proportion of surveyed postal employees who had initiated prophylaxis varied across sites: 1,643 (99%) in DC, 434 (99%) in NJ, and 1,786 (48%) in NY. In NY, antimicrobial prophylaxis was recommended for approximately 1,800 postal employees who were at increased risk for anthrax and made available to another 2,600 postal employees at lower risk for anthrax.

Antimicrobial	No. persons on	Repo sev nau: vomi diarr or abdom	ere sea, ting, hea,	Repo faint light-hea or diz	ting, dedness,	Repo heart or acid	burn	Repo rash, I or itch	nives,	follo beca	uired w-up use of e events*	Requi hospitali		Disconti prophy becaus adver even	laxis se of rse
and site	prophylaxis	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)
Ciprofloxacin	3,428														
NJ	365	94	(26)	46	(13)	47	(13)	43	(12)	4	(1)	0	(0)	26	(7)
NYC	1,612	231	(14)	166	(10)	89	(6)	86	(5)	25	(2)	0	(0)	63	(4)
DC	1,451	341	(24)	272	(19)	114	(8)	87	(6)	42	(3)	NA [†]		27	(2)
Doxycycline	232														
NJ	55	10	(18)	4	(7)	11	(20)	6	(11)	2	(4)	0	(0)	0	(0)
NIVC	96	11	(11)	1	(1)	4	(4)	2	(2)	2	(2)	0	(0)	1	(1)
NYC															

* Persons who required detailed follow-up reported difficulty breathing; throat tightness and difficulty swallowing; swelling of lips, tongue, or face; or rash, hives, or itchy skin, and sought medical attention for their symptoms.

[†] Not available.

Adverse Events — Continued

higher rates of adverse events in NJ compared with NYC and DC (p=0.001), may be explained by the different mode of administration of the questionnaires (nurse versus self-administered). Discontinuation of therapy caused by adverse events was similar to other groups previously studied (5). Both active and passive monitoring of adverse events and promotion and assessment of adherence to prophylaxis will continue for the duration of the recommended postexposure prophylaxis.

References

- 1. CDC. Update: investigation of anthrax associated with intentional exposure and interim public health guidelines, October 2001. MMWR 2001;50:889–93.
- CDC. Update: investigation of bioterrorist-related anthrax and adverse events from antimicrobial prophylaxis. MMWR 2001;50:973–6.
- 3. Segev S, Yaniv I, Haverstock D, Reinhart M. Safety of long-term therapy with ciprofloxacin: data of controlled clinical trials and review. Clin Infect Dis 1999;28:229–308.
- 4. Food and Drug Administration. Medical review. Available at <http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi /nda/2000/19-537S038_cipro.htm>. Accessed November 2001.
- 5. Halkin H. Adverse effects of the fluoroquinolones. Rev Infect Dis 1988;10(suppl 1):S258-S261.

HIV Testing Among Racial/Ethnic Minorities — United States, 1999

Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in the United States disproportionately affect racial/ethnic minority populations, particularly blacks and Hispanics (1). Of the 774,467 AIDS cases reported to CDC during June 1981–December 2000 (2), blacks and Hispanics accounted for 56% of cases, although they represented 25% of the U.S. population during this period. In 2000, the incidence of adult and adolescent AIDS cases per 100,000 population was 74.2 for blacks, 30.4 for Hispanics, and 7.9 for whites (2). HIV counseling and testing services potentially can reduce the risk for infection with HIV and provide referrals to HIV-infected persons for medical care. An estimated 300,000 HIV-infected persons in the United States may be unaware of their HIV serostatus (3). In 2001, CDC introduced the Serostatus Approach to Fighting the Epidemic (SAFE) (3), which focuses on increasing the number of high-risk and infected persons who know their serostatus and helps infected persons receive and maintain appropriate medical care and reduce their risk for transmitting infection. CDC analyzed data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to determine the rate at which racial/ethnic minorities are getting tested for HIV. This report describes the result of the analysis, which indicates that minority populations are being tested for HIV infection at a high rate; however, a substantial number of persons at risk for HIV have not been tested. Prevention programs should continue to develop innovative methods for counseling and testing at-risk persons.

NHIS is an annual, household-based health survey representing the civilian, noninstitutionalized U.S. population aged \geq 18 years (4). The 1999 NHIS data are based on interviews with 30,801 respondents. The response rate for sample adults was 70%. To determine high-risk behaviors, respondents were asked, "Tell me if any of these statements is true for you: you have hemophilia and have received clotting factor concentrations; you are a man who has had sex with another man at some time since 1980, even one time; you have taken street drugs by needle at any time since 1980; you have traded sex for money or drugs at any time since 1980; since 1980, you are or have been the sex partner of any person who would answer 'yes' to any of the items on this card/any of the items I have read."

HIV Testing — Continued

Two of the outcome measures estimated were the percentage of respondents who reported that they had ever been tested for HIV (excluding testing for blood donation) and the percentage who reported that they had been tested during the 12 months preceding the survey. HIV testing rates were computed separately for HIV risk behavior and perceived risk by race/ethnicity. Percentages were computed using all respondents, including 4.2% who refused, did not answer, or did not know if they had ever been tested. Weighting factors were used to compensate for the effects of nonresponses and unequal selection probabilities. Differences among subgroups were assessed using chi-square tests of difference (p<0.05); confidence intervals (CIs) and significance tests were computed using SUDAAN 7.0 to adjust for the effects of the complex survey design.

Among 30,801 respondents, 668 (1.9%) (95% CI=1.7%–2.1%) reported at least one of the HIV risk behaviors on the list and were considered at increased risk for infection. Rating their own perceived risk as high, medium, low, or none, 760 (2.3%; [95% CI=2.1%–2.5%]) stated that they had a high or medium chance of becoming infected with HIV. A total of 1,303 respondents were in either of these risk categories (3.9%; [95% CI=3.6%–4.2%]).

Among the 30,801 respondents, 43.8% (95% Cl=43.1%–44.6%) reported that they had ever been tested for HIV, including testing for blood donation. Blacks were significantly more likely to report previous HIV testing (51.6% [95% Cl=49.6%–53.8%]) than Hispanics (39.5% [95% Cl=37.7%–41.3%]) or whites (43.6% [95% Cl=42.8%–44.4%]).

Of all respondents (excluding those tested for blood donation), 30.9% reported having ever been tested for HIV; blacks reported previous testing more frequently (45.5%) than Hispanics (33.1%) or whites (28.5%) (Table 1)*. Among persons who reported any HIV risk behavior, 72.7% reported ever being tested and of persons who perceived a high or medium risk for HIV infection, 54.3% reported ever being tested. Within each racial/ ethnic population, more persons who reported any HIV risk behavior were tested than those who did not report any HIV risk behavior, including blacks (82.2%), Hispanics (73.5%), and whites (72.6%). Among those reporting a high or medium perceived risk, past HIV testing was reported more frequently by blacks (70.2%) than Hispanics (62.8%) or whites (50.7%). Testing during the 12 months preceding the survey was reported more frequently by blacks (20.4%) than Hispanics (11.7%) or whites (8.1%) (Table 1). Among persons who reported either HIV risk behavior or high or medium perceived risk, testing during the 12 months preceding the survey was reported more frequently by blacks (20.4%) than Hispanics (11.7%) or whites (8.1%) (Table 1).

Although persons with perceived risk or who reported any HIV risk behavior were more likely than others to be tested, a substantial proportion of this group reported never having been tested for HIV: blacks (26.4% [95% Cl=19.5%–33.4%]), Hispanics (35.3% [95% Cl=26.1%–44.5%]), and whites (38.9% [95% Cl=34.9%–42.9%]) representing an estimated 196,000–380,000 blacks, 188,000–455,000 Hispanics, and 1.8–2.4 million whites. More blacks were tested "just to find out their HIV status," while more whites were tested because it was required for insurance, employment, surgery, or military service (Table 2). Hispanics were equally divided between testing just to find out infection status; testing required for hospitalization, insurance, new job, and other application processes; and testing because it was recommended by a health-care provider or sex partner.

Reported by: Div of HIV/AIDS Prevention–Surveillance, and Epidemiology, Div of HIV/AIDS Prevention–Intervention, Research, and Support, National Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention; and an EIS Officer, CDC.

^{*}Numbers for other racial/ethnic groups were too small for meaningful analysis.

TABLE 1. Percentage* of persons aged >18 years who reported ever having had an HIV test (excludes testing for blood
donation) and who reported having been tested during the 12 months preceding the survey, by HIV risk, perceived
risk, and race/ethnicity — National Health Interview Survey, United States, 1999

	All races/ethnicities				Black			Hispanic	:		White	
		%			%			%			%	
	No.	tested		No.	tested	(a=a) a n	No.	tested		No.	tested	
Testing status	interviewed	tor HIV	/ (95% Cl⁺)	interviewed	for HIV	(95% CI)	interviewed	for HIV	(95% CI)	interviewed	for HIV	(95% CI)
Ever tested for HIV												
HIV risk behavior												
Yes	668	(72.7)	(68.2–77.3)	97	(82.2)	(72.4–91.9)	96	(73.5)	(60.9-86.1)	448	(72.6)	(67.7–77.5)
No	30,133	(30.1)	(29.4–30.7)	4,131	(44.8)	(42.6–46.9)	4,897	(32.3)	(30.7–34.0)	20,132	(27.7)	(27.0–28.5)
Perceived risk												
High/Medium	760	(54.3)	(50.2–58.4)	147	(70.2)	(61.3–79.1)	122	(62.8)	(51.8–73.8)	455	(50.7)	(45.6–55.9)
Others⁵	30,041	(30.3)	(29.7–31.0)	4,081	(44.6)	(42.4–46.9)	4,871	(32.3)	(30.7–33.9)	20,125	(28.1)	(27.3–28.8)
Either												
Yes	1,303	(61.1)	(58.0–64.1)	221	(73.3)	(66.4-80.3)	190	(64.5)	(55.2–73.8)	834	(59.5)	(55.6–63.4)
No	29,498	(29.7)	(29.0–30.3)	4,007	(44.1)	(41.9–46.3)	4,803	(31.8)	(30.2–33.4)	19,746	(27.4)	(26.6–28.1)
Total	30,801	(30.9)	(30.2–31.5)	4,228	(45.5)	(43.3–47.6)	4,993	(33.1)	(31.4–34.7)	20,580	(28.5)	(27.8–29.3)
Tested during previous 12 mont	ha											
HIV risk behavior												
Yes	668	(20.4)	(26.1–34.7)	97	(49.0)	(36.7–61.3)	96	(20 0)	(19.0–38.5)	448	(20 E)	(23.4–33.5)
No	30,133		(20.1-34.7)	4,131	(49.0)	(18.3–21.4)		1 /	(19.0–38.5)			(23.4–33.5)
Perceived risk	30,133	(9.5)	(9.1- 9.9)	4,131	(19.9)	(10.3-21.4)	4,097	(11.3)	(10.3-12.4)	20,132	(7.0)	(7.3- 0.2)
High/Medium	760	(24.6)	(21.4–27.8)	147	(36.5)	(28.3–44.6)	122	(22.6)	(22.5–42.7)	455	(20.8)	(17.1–24.6)
Others	30,041	/	(9.1–10.0)	4,081	(19.9)	(18.3–21.5)		1	(10.1–12.2)		/	(7.4–8.3)
Either	30,041	(9.0)	(3.1-10.0)	4,001	(19.9)	(10.3-21.5)	4,071	(11.1)	(10.1-12.2)	20,123	(7.9)	(7.4- 0.3)
Yes	1,303	(25.4)	(22.7–28.1)	221	(39.8)	(32.5–47.1)	190	(27 E)	(19.3–35.7)	834	(22 6)	(19.4–25.8)
No	-		(22.7-20.1)	4,007	(39.8) (19.4)	(32.5-47.1)			(19.3-35.7) (10.0-12.1)			(19.4–25.8)
Total	29,498 30,801	,	(8.9– 9.7) (9.5–10.3)	4,007 4,228	(19.4) (20.4)	(17.8–21.0)	4,803 4,993	/	(10.0–12.1)	- / -	· - /	(7.2-8.0) (7.7-8.6)

* Computed using all respondents, including 4.2% who refused, did not answer, or did not know whether they had ever been tested.
 * Confidence interval.
 * Includes persons who stated that their risk for HIV infection was low, none, or did not know, and persons who refused or did not answer.

MMWR

1056

HIV Testing

— Continued

HIV Testing — Continued

Race/		Just to find out infection status		Required test ⁺
Ethnicity	No.	(%) (95% Cl⁵)	(%) (95% Cl)	(%) (95% Cl)
Black	867	(42.9) (38.3–47.5	5) (28.5) (24.7–32.3)	(26.1) (22.5–29.6)
Hispanic	631	(33.9) (29.5–38.3	3) (34.6) (30.4–38.9)	(31.7) (27.1–36.3)
White	1,677	(25.5) (23.1–28.0)) (29.2) (26.7–31.7)	(38.6) (35.9–41.4)
Total	3,274	(30.6) (28.5–32.6	6) (29.4) (27.5–31.3)	(35.3) (33.2–37.3)

TABLE 2. Reasons for being tested for HIV in persons aged \geq 18 years who were
tested during the 12 months preceding the survey, by race/ethnicity — National
Health Interview Survey, United States, 1999

* By doctor, sex partner, health department, or for pregnancy.

⁺ For hospitalization/surgery, health/life insurance, health-care provider guidelines, new job, military, or immigration.

[§] Confidence interval.

Editorial Note: On the basis of data from the 1999 NHIS, 30.9% of adults in the United States have been tested for HIV (excluding testing for blood donation), an increase from 5% in 1987 and 26% in 1995 (*5*). In the late 1980s, rates of HIV testing (excluding testing for blood donation) were slightly higher for blacks (7%) and Hispanics (7%) than whites (5%) (*6*). The 1999 data indicated a higher rate of HIV testing among minority populations. However, a substantial number of persons at risk for HIV has never been tested.

The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, self-reported data are subject to recall bias or other reporting errors. Second, highly sensitive information about risk behaviors and perception of risk may be underreported during a face-to-face interview; some persons at high risk may report low risk or low perception of risk. Others may not be fully aware of their partners' current or past high-risk behaviors. Third, there is no information on HIV serostatus of the respondents. Fourth, the survey does not include hospitalized or incarcerated persons.

The number of untested, at-risk persons has important public health implications. These data may be useful in evaluating the SAFE strategy and focusing CDC prevention programs. Persons unaware of their HIV-positive status cannot access HIV therapy and may be spreading infection. In a recent study, approximately 35% of men aged 15–22 years who had had sex with men reported not having been tested for HIV infection and many of these men reported having unprotected sexual intercourse (7).

At-risk, untested persons are more likely to be tested if they acknowledge risky behaviors, perceive risk for HIV infection, have access to services and culturally sensitive testing programs, and are guaranteed confidentiality (\mathcal{B}). In addition, persons are more likely to be tested when HIV counseling and testing are recommended routinely than when testing is based on the person's request (\mathcal{G}).

HIV testing provides the opportunity for persons to learn their serostatus and to be counseled to adopt risk reduction strategies to prevent getting infected or, if HIV positive, to prevent transmitting the infection to others and to access care. Persons who test HIV positive are more likely to take steps to protect their partners than when they were unaware of their infection (*10*). Although minority populations with the highest HIV incidence were most likely to be tested, a substantial number of persons at risk, regardless of race/ethnicity, remains untested. Prevention programs should continue to develop innovative methods for counseling and testing at-risk persons and to ensure that seropositive persons are referred for appropriate care.

HIV Testing — Continued

References

- 1. Karon JM, Fleming PL, Steketee RW, DeCock KM. HIV in the United States at the turn of the century: an epidemic in transition. Am J Public Health 2001;91:1060–8.
- 2. CDC. HIV/AIDS surveillance report. Atlanta, Georgia: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, 2000;12(no. 2).
- 3. Janssen RS, Holtgrave DR, Valdiserri RO, Shepherd M, Gayle HD, DeCock KM. The serostatus approach to fighting the HIV epidemic: prevention strategies for infected individuals. Am J Public Health 2001;91:1019–24.
- CDC. 1999 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) public use data release. Hyattsville, Maryland: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, National Center for Health Statistics; July 2001.
- Anderson JE, Carey JW, Taveras S. HIV testing among the general US population and persons at increased risk: information from national surveys, 1987–1996. Am J Public Health 2000;90:1089–95.
- 6. Hardy AM, Dawson DA. HIV antibody testing among adults in the United States: data from the 1988 NHIS. Am J Public Health 1990;80:586–9.
- 7. Valleroy LA, Mackellar DA, Karon JM, et al. HIV prevalence and associated risks in young men who have sex with men. JAMA 2000;284:198–204.
- 8. Irwin K, Valdiserri RO, Holmberg S. The acceptability of voluntary HIV antibody testing in the United States: a decade of lessons learned. AIDS 1996;10:1707–17.
- 9. CDC. Routinely recommending HIV testing at an urban urgent-care clinic—Atlanta, Georgia, 2000. MMWR 2001;50:538-41.
- 10. Wenger NS, Kusseling FS, Beck K, Shapiro MF. Sexual behavior of individuals with human immunodeficiency virus: the need for intervention. Arch Intern Med 1994;154:1849–54.

Simultaneous Administration of Varicella Vaccine and Other Recommended Childhood Vaccines — United States, 1995–1999

Live attenuated varicella vaccine (Var) is recommended in the United States for children aged 12–18 months and for susceptible older children, adolescents, and adults (1). The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends that Var be administered either simultaneously with measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine or separately by \geq 30 days (1). This report summarizes an evaluation of these recommendations, which found that a decrease in Var effectiveness occurred when Var was administered <30 days after MMR; therefore, as currently recommended, physicians should administer Var simultaneously with MMR or wait at least 30 days if the vaccines are administered separately.

Using the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) project, the effectiveness of Var was assessed when administered simultaneously with or within 30 days of administering MMR; diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine (DTP); *Haemophilus influenzae* type B vaccine (Hib); oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV); inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV); and hepatitis B vaccine (HepB). VSD links computerized vaccination records to clinic and hospital discharge records of children from several large health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States (*2*). VSD has expanded from four to seven HMOs and includes an estimated 2.5% of the U.S. population.

A retrospective cohort study was conducted among children from the two HMOs in the VSD project with the earliest available automated clinic data and the highest uptake of Var. Children included in the study cohort were those who received Var at age

Varicella Vaccine — Continued

 \geq 12 months during January 1995–December 1999 at HMO A and during January 1996– December 1999 at HMO B. The effectiveness (or failure) of Var can be measured by the proportion of vaccinated children who develop varicella breakthrough infections (i.e., cases of varicella that occur following exposure to wild-type virus) >42 days after Var; each recommended vaccine was compared with the incidence of breakthrough varicella in children who received Var simultaneously with the vaccine, children who received Var <30 days after the vaccine, and control children who received Var \geq 30 days before or after the vaccine.

To identify breakthrough disease, clinic and hospital discharge records from both HMOs were screened for having the same *International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, (ICD-9)* codes* for varicella. Automated telephone contact records available at HMO B also were screened for reports of varicella. Cox proportional hazards models were used to estimate the relative risks (RRs) for breakthrough disease between children receiving Var and other recommended childhood vaccines at different intervals, group-matched on year of birth, year and month of vaccination, and HMO membership.

A cohort was identified of 104,192 children vaccinated with Var from HMO A and 10,482 from HMO B. The median age of children receiving Var was 15 months (range: 12–71 months). The median follow-up time after Var was administered was 20 months (range: 1 day–4.5 years). The number of children aged \geq 12 months receiving other vaccines simultaneously with Var, receiving Var before 30 days following other vaccines, and receiving Var \geq 30 days before or after other vaccines also were identified (Table 1). The median age and age range were not available for vaccines other than Var.

The simultaneous administration with Var of the vaccines studied did not increase the risk for breakthrough disease (Table 2). Receipt of Var <30 days following MMR was associated with a 2.5-fold increase in the incidence of breakthrough disease (95% confidence interval [CI]=1.3–4.9). Receipt of Var <30 days following any of the other vaccines did not increase the risk for breakthrough disease.

Reported by: J Mullooly, PhD, Northwest Kaiser Permanente, Portland, Oregon. S Black, MD, Northern California Kaiser Permanente, Oakland and San Francisco, California. Child Vaccine Preventable Disease Br and Vaccine Safety and Development Activity, Epidemiology and Surveillance Div, National Immunization Program; and an EIS Officer, CDC.

Editorial Note: No adverse effects have been reported of simultaneous administration of DTP, Hib, MMR, and OPV on the immunogenicity of Var (*3–6*), and the absence of increased risk for breakthrough varicella among children receiving MMR, DTP, Hib, OPV, IPV or HepB simultaneously with Var confirms these findings. Recommendations that caution against the use of Var and MMR within 30 days of each other (*1*) are based on the reported reduction in responsiveness to smallpox vaccine following measles vaccine (*7*). Findings in this report indicate an increased risk for breakthrough disease in children who received Var <30 days after MMR. No increase in breakthrough disease was noted in children who were administered Var <30 days after any of the other vaccines.

The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, the VSD database contains only information on medical encounters. The number of cases of breakthrough varicella, which is usually mild and not brought to medical attention (8), may be underestimated; however, this underestimation is not likely to differ by vaccine administration schedules. Second, misclassification of cases might have occurred during the assignment of *ICD-9* codes.

^{*}Code 052.

Varicella Vaccine — Continued

		Simulta with			0 days ter	Var <u>></u> 30 days before or after		
Vaccine	e* No.	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
MMR	112,847	78,595	(68.5)	767	(0.7)	33,485	(29.2)	
DTP	106,636	48,930	(42.7)	849	(0.7)	56,857	(49.6)	
Hib	69,691	33,673	(29.4)	573	(0.5)	35,445	(30.9)	
OPV	46,824	17,756	(15.5)	341	(0.3)	28,727	(25.1)	
IPV	9,859	4,810	(4.2)	118	(0.1)	4,931	(4.3)	
НерВ	19,917	7,368	(6.4)	441	(0.4)	12,108	(10.6)	

TABLE 1. Number of children aged \geq 12 months who received varicella vaccine
(Var) and another vaccine, by vaccine and interval to Var — California and Oregon,
1995–1999

* MMR: combined measles-mumps-rubella vaccine; DTP: diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine; Hib: *Haemophilus influenzae* type B vaccine; OPV: oral poliovirus vaccine; IPV: inactivated poliovirus vaccine; HepB: hepatitis B vaccine.

TABLE 2. Relative risk (RR) of infection with breakthrough varicella in children aged \geq 12 months associated with receiving another vaccine <30 days preceding varicella vaccine (Var) or simultaneously compared with receiving Var \geq 30 days before or after another vaccine, by vaccine — California and Oregon, 1995–1999

	Simultar	neous with Var	Var _<30 days later			
Vaccine*	RR	(CI⁺)	RR	(CI)		
MMR	1.1	(0.9–1.4)	2.5⁵	(1.3–4.9)		
DTP	1.1	(0.9–1.3)	1.0	(0.4–2.6)		
Hib	1.1	(0.8–1.3)	0.4	(0.1–2.6)		
OPV	1.1	(0.8–1.5)	1.6	(0.5–5.1)		
IPV	2.1	(0.5-8.4)	¶			
НерВ	1.2	(0.7–1.9)	2.3	(0.8-6.7)		

* MMR: combined measles-mumps-rubella vac)cine; DTP: diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine; Hib: *Haemophilus Influenzae* type B vaccine; OPV: oral poliovirus vaccine; IPV: inactivated poliovirus vaccine; HepB: hepatitis B vaccine.

⁺ Confidence interval.

[§] RR significant.

[¶] Numbers were too small for meaningful analysis.

No evidence was found that simultaneous administration of MMR, DTP, Hib, OPV, IPV, or HepB and Var increases the risk for breakthrough disease. To minimize the number of visits needed for immunization, Var should be administered simultaneously with these vaccines or should follow administration of MMR by \geq 30 days.

References

- 1. CDC. Prevention of varicella—recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR 1996;45(no. RR-11).
- 2. Chen RT, Glasser JW, Rhodes PH, et al. Vaccine Safety Datalink Project: a new tool for improving vaccine safety monitoring in the United States. Pediatrics 1997;99:765–73.
- 3. Englund JA, Suarez CS, Kelly J, Tate DY, Balfour HH Jr. Placebo-controlled trial of varicella vaccine given with or after measles-mumps-rubella vaccine. J Pediatr 1989;114:37–44.
- 4. Just M, Berger R, Just V. Evaluation of a combined measles-mumps-rubella-chickenpox vaccine. Dev Biol Stand 1986;65:85–8.
- 5. White CJ. Clinical trials of varicella vaccine in healthy children. Infect Dis Clin North Am 1996;10:595–608.

Varicella Vaccine — Continued

- 6. Shinefield HR, Black SB, Morozumi P. Safety and immunogenicity of concomitant separate administration of MMR II, Tetramune (Wyeth Lederle DTP & HbOC) and Varivax (Oka/Merck Varicella Vaccine) vs concomitant injections of MMR II, Tetramune with BVarivax given six weeks later. Washington, DC: Society for Pediatric Research; 1996.
- Petralli JK, Merigan TC, Wilbur JR. Action of endogenous interferon against vaccinia infection in children. Lancet 1965;295:401–5.
- 8. Watson BM, Piercy SA, Plotkin SA, Starr SE. Modified chickenpox in children immunized with the Oka/Merck varicella vaccine. Pediatrics 1993;91:17–22.


Weekly Update: West Nile Virus Activity — United States, November 14–20, 2001

The following report summarizes West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance data reported to CDC through ArboNET and verified by states and other jurisdictions as of November 20, 2001.

During the week of November 14–20, three human cases of WNV encephalitis or meningitis were reported from Massachusetts (two) and New Jersey (one). During the same period, WNV infections were reported in 87 crows, 23 other birds, and 13 horses. A total of three WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported from two states (Georgia and Ohio).

During 2001, a total of 48 human cases of WNV encephalitis or meningitis have been reported in New York (12), Florida (10), New Jersey (seven), Connecticut (six), Maryland (six), Pennsylvania (three), Massachusetts (two), Georgia (one), and Louisiana (one). Among these 48 cases, 27 (56%) were in males; the median age was 70 years (range: 36–90 years); dates of illness onset ranged from July 13 to October 15; and five (10%) patients died. A total of 4,604 crows and 1,497 other birds with WNV infection were reported from 27 states and the District of Columbia (Figure 1); 189 WNV infections in other animals (all horses) were reported from 15 states (Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia). During 2001, 756 WNV-positive mosquito pools were reported from 15 states (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia.

Additional information about WNV activity is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ dvbid/westnile/index.htm> and <http://cindi.usgs.gov/hazard/event/west_nile/ west_nile.html>. Because WNV season is ending, this is the last week of publication of the weekly updates on WNV activity. A full report on WNV surveillance will be published in *MMWR* at a later date. West Nile Virus — Continued





* As of November 20, 2001.

Notice to Readers

World AIDS Day — December 1, 2001

"I care, do you?" is the theme designated by the Joint United Nations Program on Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) for this year's World AIDS Day, December 1, 2001. This year's theme highlights the impact of HIV on youth and encourages young persons to learn about and to become more involved in the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of HIV/AIDS.

As of June 2001, AIDS was reported among 793,026 persons in the United States; of these, 41,093 (5.2%) were aged <25 years at time of diagnosis (1). During July 2000–June 2001, a total of 3,398 (15.4%) persons aged 13–24 years were newly reported with HIV infection from the 36 areas with confidential HIV reporting (1). In addition, youth are at high risk for acquiring other sexually transmitted infections. In 2000, persons aged 15–24 years accounted for 74% of reported chlamydia, 60% of gonorrhea, and 22% of early syphilis cases (2). Effective HIV prevention interventions among youth may set lifelong patterns of sexual safety and responsibility. Increasing the proportion of youth who consistently engage in behaviors that reduce the risk for HIV acquisition or transmission is a key objective of CDC's 5-year HIV Prevention Strategic Plan to reduce new HIV infections in the United States (3).

The estimated number of AIDS cases diagnosed each year among children (i.e., aged <13 years) has declined consistently, from a peak of 949 in 1992 to 105 cases in 2000 (1). Declines in AIDS incidence among U.S. children are associated with the implementation of U.S. Public Health Service recommendations for use of zidovudine to reduce perinatal transmission (4).

Notices to Readers — Continued

Globally, an estimated 620,000 children aged <15 years were newly infected with HIV, and 500,000 children died of AIDS in 1999 (5). However, improving access to and use of interventions, including abbreviated antiretroviral regimens to prevent perinatal HIV transmission, may help decrease the number of infections in children. CDC's Global AIDS Program, in collaboration with other U.S. agencies, UNAIDS, and other international agencies, is assisting ministries of health to implement widespread use of these regimens (6) as part of its wider support for programs to prevent HIV, provide home- and community-based care for HIV-infected persons, and enhance surveillance, laboratory, and other infrastructures in 24 countries.

Additional information about World AIDS Day, HIV infection, and AIDS is available at http://www.unaids.org. Information about the U.S. epidemic is available at 800-342-AIDS or in Spanish at 800-244-7432.

References

- 1. CDC. HIV/AIDS Surveillance report. Atlanta, Georgia: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, 2001;13.
- 2. CDC. Sexually transmitted disease surveillance 2000. Atlanta, Georgia: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, September 2001.
- CDC. HIV prevention strategic plan through 2005. Atlanta, Georgia: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, January 2001. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/hiv_plan/default.htm. Accessed November 2001.
- 4. Lindegren ML, Byers RH, Thomas P, et al. Trends in perinatal transmission of HIV/AIDS in the United States. JAMA 1999;282:531–8.
- 5. UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic: June 2000. Available at http://www.unaids.org>. Accessed November 2001.
- CDC. Evaluation of a regional pilot program to prevent mother-infant HIV transmission— Thailand, 1998–2000. MMWR 2001;50:599–603.

Notice to Readers

National Drunk and Drugged Driving Prevention Month — December 2001

December has been designated by Presidential proclamation as National Drunk and Drugged Driving Prevention Month (3D Month). 3D Month is supported by many public and private sector organizations devoted to preventing impaired driving crashes. During 2000, alcohol-related motor-vehicle crashes resulted in 16,653 deaths in the United States (1). On the basis of data provided by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (1) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2), the rate of alcohol-related traffic fatalities in 2000 was 5.9 per 100,000 persons. One of the national health objectives for 2010 is a target for alcohol-related traffic fatalities of no more than 4.0 per 100,000 persons (objective 26-1A) (3). To meet this objective, the annual rate of alcoholrelated traffic fatalities must decline by 32%.

CDC recently concluded a systematic review of the effectiveness of five communitybased interventions to reduce alcohol-impaired driving: sobriety checkpoints; 0.08% blood alcohol concentration laws; minimum legal drinking age laws; "zero tolerance" laws for young or inexperienced drivers; and server intervention training programs*. All five interventions showed evidence of effectiveness (4) and each was recommended for

^{*}Available at <http://www.thecommunityguide.org>.

Notices to Readers — Continued

implementation by the Task Force on Community Preventive Services (5,6), an independent, nonfederal panel of community-health consultants. Broader use of such strategies will be necessary to achieve the 2010 objective of reducing alcohol-related traffic fatalities.

The theme for this year's 3D Month is "This holiday season...the greatest gift you can give may be a ride home." The 3D Month program planner, which contains sample public service announcements, media tool kits, and program guidance for conducting 3D Month activities, is available from NHTSA at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov or on CD-ROM, by faxing a request to 301-386-2194.

References

- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Traffic safety facts 2000: alcohol. Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2001; publication no. DOT-HS-809-323.
- 2. US Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce. Available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsServlet. Accessed October 2001.
- 3. US Department of Health and Human Services. Healthy people 2010 (conference ed., 2 vols). Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2000.
- 4. Shults RA, Elder RW, Sleet DA, et al. Reviews of evidence regarding interventions to reduce alcohol-impaired driving. Am J Prev Med 2001;21(4S):66–88.
- CDC. Motor vehicle occupant injury: interventions for increasing use of child safety seats, increasing use of safety belts, and reducing alcohol-impaired driving: a report on recommendations of the Task Force on Community Preventive Services. MMWR 2001;50(no. RR-7):1–13.
- 6. Task Force on Community Preventive Services. Recommendations to reduce injuries to motor vehicle occupants: increasing child safety seat use, increasing safety belt use, and reducing alcohol-impaired driving. Am J Prev Med 2001;21(4S):16–22.

Notice to Readers

Alcohol Involvement in Fatal Motor-Vehicle Crashes — United States, 1999–2000

The following table compares alcohol involvement in fatal motor-vehicle crashes by age group and blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels for 1999 and 2000. A fatal crash is considered alcohol-related by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) if either a driver or nonoccupant (e.g., pedestrian) had a BAC of \geq 0.01 g/dL in a police-reported traffic crash. Because BACs are not available for all persons in fatal crashes, NHTSA estimates the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities on the basis of a discriminant analysis of information from all cases for which driver or nonoccupant BAC data are available (1).


Overall during 1999–2000, the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities increased by 4% (95% confidence interval [CI]=2%–7%). For BACs \geq 0.10 g/dL (the legal limit for intoxication in most states in 1999 and 2000), fatalities increased by 4% (95% Cl=1%–6%); for BACs of 0.01–0.09 g/dL, fatalities increased by 7% (95% Cl=2%–12%). A broad range of public health and traffic safety strategies will be needed to stem further increases and reduce the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities (2).

Notices to Readers — Continued

References

- 1. Klein TM. A method for estimating posterior BAC distributions for persons involved in fatal traffic accidents: final report. Washington, DC: US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1986; publication no. DOT-HS-807-094.
- Shults RA, Elder RW, Sleet DA, et al. Reviews of evidence regarding interventions to reduce alcohol-impaired driving. Am J Prev Med 2001;21(4S):66–88.

Changes in the estimated number and percentage of traffic fatalities (including drivers, occupants, and nonoccupants), by age group* and highest blood alcohol concentration (BAC)[†] of drivers[§] or nonoccupants in crashes — United States, January1–December 31, 1999, compared with January 1–December 31, 2000



- * Age of decedent was unknown for 87 traffic fatalities in 1999 and 374 in 2000. Decedents of unknown age were included in the calculations of the total number of fatalities by BAC level.
- [†] BAC distributions are estimates for drivers and nonoccupants involved in fatal crashes. Fatalities include all occupants and nonoccupants who died within 30 days after a motorvehicle crash on a public roadway.
- [§] Driver may not have been killed.
- [¶] Percentage change statistically significant at p=0.05.

** The number of fatalities for each BAC category is rounded to the nearest whole number. Source: Fatality Analysis Reporting System, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Erratum: Vol. 50, No. 40

In the article "Cigarette Smoking Among Adults—United States, 1999," on page 871, Figure 1, the source line should read, "Sample adult core component of the National Health Interview Survey. Estimate for *2001* based on data collected during January–*March 2001*.

Erratum: Vol. 50, No. 21

In the article "HIV and AIDS—United States, 1981–2000," on page 431 in Table 1, the number of white non-Hispanic persons with AIDS reported during 1996–2000 should be *89,896*, and the number of persons with AIDS reported for U.S. territories during 1993–1995 should be *8,182*. The percentage of black, non-Hispanic persons with AIDS reported during 1988–1992 should be *31.3%*. On page 443, in the last sentence of the first paragraph, the estimated number of cases of perinatally acquired AIDS diagnosed in 1999 should be *156*.




FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week totals ending November 24, 2001, with historical data

- * No rubella cases were reported for the current 4-week period yielding a ratio for week 47 of zero (0).
- [†] Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.

		Cum. 2001		Cum. 2001
Anthrax		14	Poliomyelitis, paralytic	-
Brucellosis [†]		76	Psittacosis [†]	22
Cholera		3	Qfever [†]	20
Cyclosporiasis	S [†]	128	Rabies, human	1
Diphtheria		2	Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF)	553
Ehrlichiosis:	human granulocytic (HGE)†	188	Rubella, congenital syndrome	-
	human monocytic (HME) [†]	82	Streptococcal disease, invasive, group A	3,222
Encephalitis:	California serogroup viral [†]	99	Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome [†]	43
·	eastern equine [†]	8	Syphilis, congenital [¶]	190
	St. Louis [†]	1	Tetanus	23
	western equine [†]	-	Toxic-shock syndrome	104
Hansen diseas	se (leprosy)†	76	Trichinosis	25
	Imonary syndrome [†]	6	Tularemia [†]	96
	mic syndrome, postdiarrheal [†]	135	Typhoid fever	248
HIV infection,	pediatric ^{†§}	181	Yellow fever	-
Plaque		2		

TABLE I. Summary of provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, cumulative, week ending November 24, 2001 (47th Week)*

-: No reported cases. *Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date).

⁵ Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV,

STD, and TB Prevention (NCHSTP). Last updated October 30, 2001. ¹Updated from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, NCHSTP.

			051		Com-				<i>coli</i> O157:H7	
	AII Cum.	Cum.	Chlam Cum.	, Cum.	Cum.	ooridiosis Cum.	NET Cum.	Cum.	PH Cum.	Cum.
Reporting Area	2001 [¶] 33,013	2000 32,692	2001 641,362	2000 625,027	2001 3,033	2,791	2001 2,790	2000 4,200	2001 2,133	2000 3,461
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	1,276 40 31 13 661 85 446	1,673 28 28 29 1,049 81 458	21,053 1,187 1,225 561 8,915 2,668 6,497	21,220 1,312 996 484 9,079 2,420 6,929	117 18 15 31 49 4	129 20 22 26 34 3 24	2,100 216 26 35 13 113 14 15	361 31 35 34 159 19 83	219 26 29 8 109 11 36	367 28 38 35 164 18 84
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	7,683 823 3,788 1,537 1,535	7,090 665 3,755 1,423 1,247	73,540 13,089 26,709 10,547 23,195	59,047 2,810 23,766 9,446 23,025	253 103 87 11 52	354 116 159 19 60	203 150 12 41 N	413 277 23 113 N	181 136 11 34	328 70 18 113 127
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	2,513 482 306 1,115 459 151	3,164 475 320 1,596 601 172	105,225 21,840 13,618 30,000 27,025 12,742	108,306 28,311 12,183 30,074 23,001 14,737	1,381 157 79 399 168 578	922 252 57 117 91 405	729 200 80 152 90 207	1,025 253 118 188 138 328	489 151 42 128 80 88	724 220 83 155 104 162
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	719 121 78 347 2 23 63 85	762 153 73 349 2 7 64 114	31,468 6,456 3,944 11,275 804 1,625 2,193 5,171	35,351 7,357 4,651 12,065 789 1,651 3,339 5,499	419 176 78 44 13 7 98 3	345 123 74 29 15 15 80 9	514 242 80 61 18 42 52 19	612 168 176 106 18 55 61 28	444 212 62 86 32 41 - 11	588 201 147 96 21 58 48 17
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	10,366 218 1,529 738 803 73 807 623 1,239 4,336	9,072 182 1,127 694 580 54 585 682 1,049 4,119	121,259 2,309 10,876 2,642 16,245 2,111 18,577 9,919 26,441 32,139	117,326 2,587 12,534 2,873 13,997 1,938 19,795 8,809 25,034 29,759	311 6 38 11 24 2 27 7 127 69	441 6 9 16 18 3 25 - 164 200	213 4 27 - 48 10 46 16 30 32	350 3 1 69 15 87 21 39 83	138 7 1 U 39 8 42 11 15 15	278 1 2 U 64 13 68 16 38 76
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	1,554 299 507 378 370	1,618 168 684 418 348	43,786 7,707 12,988 12,763 10,328	45,839 7,246 13,287 13,933 11,373	46 4 13 16 13	48 6 11 15 16	125 58 42 17 8	140 40 53 10 37	108 49 44 6 9	113 32 52 9 20
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	3,488 178 711 203 2,396	3,366 158 587 294 2,327	93,579 6,234 15,576 9,205 62,564	94,204 5,886 16,383 8,485 63,450	36 8 7 14 7	155 14 12 17 112	90 13 4 31 42	222 56 15 19 132	91 - 26 28 37	274 38 47 17 172
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	1,172 15 19 3 248 129 459 101 198	1,211 12 19 9 294 126 386 113 252	36,845 1,746 1,723 747 8,723 5,202 12,903 1,537 4,264	34,308 1,252 1,682 726 8,948 4,645 11,447 2,069 3,539	223 37 22 7 36 27 7 82 5	167 10 23 5 69 20 10 26 4	269 20 67 7 88 14 28 30 30 15	404 30 69 19 153 22 48 49 14	130 - 1 53 10 23 42 1	301 40 11 109 18 42 71 10
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	4,242 435 177 3,552 18 60	4,736 428 145 4,042 22 99	114,607 12,187 6,530 90,111 2,317 3,462	109,426 11,690 6,131 86,094 2,278 3,233	247 - 49 194 1 3	230 U 20 210	431 122 64 224 4 17	673 219 131 278 31 14	333 62 59 203 1 8	488 200 113 158 6 11
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	12 1,021 2 1 -	13 1,133 31 - -	2,240 53 U 124	452 U - U U	- - - U -		N 1 - U -	N 6 - U U	U U U U U	U U U U U

TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States,
weeks ending November 24, 2001, and November 25, 2000 (47th Week)*

N: Not notifiable.
U: Unavailable.
·: No reported cases.
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
* Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).
Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).
' Individual cases to genital infections caused by *C. trachomatis.*' Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention — Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention. Last updated October 30, 2001.

	Gond	orrhea	Hepati Non-A,	tis C; Non-B	Legione	llosis	Listeriosis	Lyı Dise	
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000
UNITED STATES	295,842	320,572	2,917	2,853	931	995	429	11,404	15,514
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt.	6,036 119 168 62	5,972 82 96 60	15 - - 7	29 2 - 4	69 9 10 5	53 2 3 5	39 2 4 3	3,727 - 138 15	5,040 - 60 40
Mass. R.I. Conn.	2,796 765 2,126	2,483 591 2,660	8 - -	18 5	21 10 14	17 9 17	24 1 5	826 449 2,299	1,134 550 3,256
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	38,127 7,958 11,359 7,198 11,612	35,245 6,721 10,426 6,435 11,663	1,449 53 - 1,342 54	631 37 551 43	181 62 24 13 82	279 84 45 22 128	64 26 11 12 15	5,637 3,311 2 927 1,397	8,051 3,498 177 2,410 1,966
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	55,171 12,193 6,090 16,669 15,593 4,626	64,469 17,465 5,722 18,942 16,035 6,305	149 5 1 13 130	214 12 19 183	274 122 22 19 75 36	257 106 35 30 48 38	64 15 8 11 23 7	633 110 23 21 13 466	762 58 22 35 23 624
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak.	13,418 2,079 1,016 7,047 35 255	16,127 2,885 1,133 7,941 64 259	673 9 651 -	546 5 2 528 -	48 9 8 21 1 3	55 7 13 25 - 2	19 2 2 10	361 296 36 24	366 267 32 45 1
Nebr. Kans.	713 2,273	1,346 2,499	4 9	4 7	5 1	4 4	1 4	32	4 17
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	74,877 1,398 6,121 2,417 9,605 643 15,079 6,622 14,570 18,422	83,279 1,560 8,701 2,402 9,398 592 16,202 7,680 16,386 20,358	97 - - 9 19 6 1 46	99 2 12 3 15 17 3 3 41	183 12 35 8 21 N 11 13 10 73	181 10 65 6 32 N 15 6 7 40	66 - 14 - 12 5 5 5 11 14	785 49 506 16 115 13 38 5 - 43	1,042 167 603 10 140 31 44 13 - 34
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	28,445 3,089 8,719 9,876 6,761	33,084 3,188 10,578 10,967 8,351	171 8 59 4 100	420 34 92 10 284	53 11 27 13 2	36 19 10 4 3	20 5 8 7	57 22 26 8 1	48 11 28 6 3
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	45,704 3,881 10,625 4,212 26,986	49,733 3,467 12,114 3,782 30,370	177 4 88 4 81	677 8 415 9 245	9 - 2 3 4	23 - 7 3 13	18 1 - 2 15	82 1 2 79	86 5 7 1 73
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah	9,077 98 69 77 2,756 877 3,508 120	9,468 47 83 44 2,866 1,028 3,802 209	63 1 2 8 21 11 9 3	69 5 3 13 13 13 18 1	51 - 3 15 3 19 6	41 5 - 14 7 12	35 - 1 2 8 7 8 2	13 - 5 1 3 - 1 1	12 - 3 - - 3
Nev. PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	1,572 24,987 2,719 1,004 20,358 374 532	1,389 23,195 2,095 898 19,450 320 432	8 123 22 12 89 -	14 168 31 25 110 - 2	4 63 10 N 49 - 4	1 70 17 N 52 - 1	7 104 10 9 79 - 6	2 109 8 9 90 2 N	4 107 9 12 84 2 N
Guam P.R. V.I.	- 541 6	50 463	- 1	3 1	2	- 1	-	Ň	Ň
Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	U 14	Ŭ U	U -	U U	U -	U U	-	U -	Ŭ U

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States,
weeks ending November 24, 2001, and November 25, 2000 (47th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. - : No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

	senang	Novembe	,1 24, 200						
		aria	Rabies	, Animal		TSS		LIS	
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	
UNITED STATES	1,131	1,339	7,144	6,419	32,870	35,552	26,807	29,645	
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	77 4 2 1 35 9 26	69 6 1 3 32 8 19	670 63 22 59 245 65 216	768 126 21 55 259 53 254	2,197 161 160 73 1,249 122 432	2,018 117 134 103 1,160 124 380	2,069 150 144 63 1,096 164 452	2,059 91 137 99 1,174 138 420	
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	328 64 195 35 34	361 72 208 47 34	1,107 726 29 178 174	1,212 770 18 182 242	3,930 1,143 991 834 962	4,608 1,132 1,111 1,072 1,293	3,578 1,213 1,287 657 421	4,879 1,192 1,199 945 1,543	
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	130 22 16 33 39 20	135 20 6 63 31 15	141 50 15 24 46 6	151 50 - 22 68 11	4,383 1,183 489 1,201 754 756	4,907 1,379 593 1,402 821 712	3,802 1,076 450 1,049 767 460	3,338 1,342 564 203 865 364	
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	32 6 7 12 - 2 5	64 27 17 2 1 8 7	323 43 74 41 37 42 4 82	497 83 72 50 107 88 2 95	2,121 599 328 604 56 144 130 260	2,200 498 338 662 55 91 204 352	2,261 665 301 888 80 118 - 209	2,373 638 329 809 74 100 137 286	
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	267 2 108 13 45 1 17 7 30 44	302 5 105 49 4 34 2 26 61	2,067 30 332 - 449 131 539 109 311 166	2,194 49 387 531 109 528 146 302 142	7,987 87 745 78 1,218 1,217 1,257 820 1,588 2,067	7,439 110 709 61 926 152 1,026 701 1,424 2,330	5,544 98 827 U 958 130 1,186 677 1,210 458	5,482 124 653 U 867 142 1,053 529 1,615 499	
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	33 12 11 6 4	44 18 11 14 1	193 27 101 63 2	195 20 99 75 1	2,437 340 584 707 806	2,217 355 589 616 657	1,715 217 738 474 286	1,683 245 757 563 118	
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	12 3 5 3 1	68 3 12 8 45	2,080 20 3 57 2,000	839 20 4 53 762	3,438 843 333 446 1,816	4,617 676 833 359 2,749	2,537 92 952 375 1,118	2,829 554 703 281 1,291	
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	54 3 - 21 3 11 4 9	49 1 3 - 24 - 9 6 6	231 38 28 20 - 14 115 15 15 1	261 64 9 55 - 20 94 10 9	1,974 72 128 55 545 268 554 203 149	2,529 90 113 65 658 220 676 456 251	1,634 4 52 566 215 582 192 23	2,348 108 57 640 196 713 453 181	
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	198 11 13 164 1 9	247 32 38 167 10	332 3 292 37	302 7 267 28	4,403 477 219 3,329 42 336	5,017 545 271 3,925 56 220	3,667 491 292 2,526 28 330	4,654 618 332 3,446 33 225	
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa	- 4 U	2 5 U	- 85 - U	72 U	515 U	26 623 U			
C.N.M.I.	-	U	-	U	14	U	U	U	

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending November 24, 2001, and November 25, 2000 (47th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. -: No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

[†] Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

Syphilis Tuber-ubsix Reporting Area Zum, 2001 Cum, 2000 Cum, 2001 Cum, 2000 Cum, 2001 Cum, 2000 Cum, 2001 Cum, 2000 Cum, 2001 Cum, 2000 Cum, 2001 Cum
NEW ENGLAND 246 379 264 359 57 78 366 377 Maine 6 10 2 11 1 1 3 16 Maine 6 10 2 11 1 1 3 16 Mass. 193 264 179 243 33 56 213 212 Conn. 17 66 49 66 10 15 95 99 MID.ATLANTIC 1,146 2,446 111 1,609 437 254 2,075 2,029 N.J. 185 486 184 418 127 63 447 489 Pa. 185 350 65 371 36 72 263 166 Ind. 2,661 375 1,127 300 71 66 235 250 260 130 Ind. 468 1,112 31 1,48 41 </th
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
Upstate N.Y. '448 '713 '113 '210 '23 '9 '320 '291 N.Y. City 328 897 349 610 251 110 1045 1063 N.Y. City 185 350 65 371 36 72 263 166 E.N. CENTRAL 3.896 3.891 1.694 1.186 928 1.115 1.210 1.291 Ohio 2.661 375 1.127 300 71 66 235 250 Ind. 448 1.112 288 114 314 385 564 620 Ill. 468 1.112 288 114 314 385 564 620 Wis. 269 317 27 55 22 44 73 77 W.N. CENTRAL 1.786 2.275 1.247 1.901 79 61 410 488 Moo. 3000 618 202 <t< td=""></t<>
Ohio 2661 375 1,127 300 71 66 295 250 Ind. 488 1,112 288 1146 326 98 130 Mich. 285 629 210 567 375 294 240 214 Wis. 269 317 27 55 22 44 73 77 W.N.CENTRAL 1,786 2,275 1,247 1,901 79 61 410 488 Iowa 352 500 290 329 4 11 34 33 Mo. 300 618 202 443 20 27 121 176 N.Dak. 21 42 34 49 - - 12 16 Nebr. 74 138 - 116 5 2 32 23 Kans. 66 229 35 128 22 6 - 74 <
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
Del.15241121981514Md.14118290109236281202222D.C.5374UU33365129Va.39042917533896121228240W.Va.81388432628N.C.316355166252411448307345S.C.24012912087207209153238Ga.366240130172335355418541Fla.7371,29234104464372846880E.S.CENTRAL1,4631,096564538591798720818Ky.6644733001084378105109Tenn.93334104358297479265304Ala.1988713066121111240273Miss.508202307130130110132W.S.CENTRAL2,0723,2471,1461,0556667507761,884Ark.522193155573595139160La.129267166176157196-200Okla.8611636<
Ky.6644733001084378105109Tenn.93334104358297479265304Ala.1988713065121111240273Miss.508202307130130110132W.S. CENTRAL2,0723,2471,1461,0556667507761,884Ark.522193155573595139166La.129267166176157196-200Okla.86116364360108125135Tex.1,3352,6717897794143515121,383
Ark.522193155573595139166La.129267166176157196-200Okla.86116364360108125135Tex.1,3352,6717897794143515121,383
MOUNTAIN 882 1,152 660 808 203 212 454 463 Mont. 8 7 - - - - 14 17 Idaho 39 44 - 25 1 1 8 8 Wyo. 3 5 5 3 1 1 3 4 Colo. 222 247 255 202 21 8 108 73 N. Mex. 113 155 75 107 17 16 24 39 Ariz. 373 498 264 324 147 180 201 193 Utah 58 76 53 81 8 1 33 41 Nev. 66 120 8 66 8 5 63 88
PACIFIC2,1893,2083313,1624803702,6802,920Wash.1974191673914360215230Oreg.8115710210713119789Calif.1,8442,591-2,6314122982,1862,380Alaska77634699Hawaii60345630121136122
Guam - 37 U U - 3 - 49 P.R. 8 33 U U 249 149 76 135 V.I. - - U U - - - -
V.I. - - U U -

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States,weeks ending November 24, 2001, and November 25, 2000 (47th Week)*

 N: Not notifiable.
 U: Unavailable.
 -: No reported cases.

 * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

 * Individual cases can be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

	H. influenzae, Hepatitis (Viral), By Type Measles (Ruber										ola)	
	Invasive		A B					Indigenous Imported [†] Total				
Reporting Area	Cum. 2001 [§]	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000
UNITED STATES	1,178	1,175	9,044	11,863	5,893	6,373	-	51	-	44	95	75
NEW ENGLAND	86	97	582	360	90	101	-	4	-	1	5	6
Maine N.H.	2 6	1 12	11 16	21 18	5 14	5 16	-	-	-	-	-	- 3
/t. Mass.	3 40	9 38	16 260	10 128	4 11	6 14	-	1 2	-	- 1	1 3	3
R.I.	5	4	59	23	25	21	-	-	-	-	-	-
Conn.	30	33	220	160	31	39	-	1	-	-	1	-
VID. ATLANTIC Jpstate N.Y.	174 68	215 93	865 244	1,393 231	909 121	1,060 121	-	5 1	-	11 4	16 5	21 10
N.Y. City N.J.	44 42	58 38	275 159	475 263	392 169	516 163	-	3	-	1 1	4 1	10
Pa.	20	26	187	424	227	260	-	1	-	5	6	1
E.N. CENTRAL	176	163	1,056	1,533	830	662	-	-	-	10	10	8
Dhio nd.	55 46	49 28	208 95	244 110	84 47	97 45	-	-	-	3 4	3 4	2
II.	40	56 9	385	651	149	108	-	-	-	3	3	3
Vich. Vis.	13 22	21	301 67	451 77	550	374 38	-	-	-	-	-	3
V.N. CENTRAL	60	72	380	617	189	267	-	4	-	1	5	2
Vinn. owa	37	42	40 36	169 62	21 25	35 31	-	2	-	1	3	1
Mo. N. Dak.	14 7	20 2	103 3	247 3	103 1	130 2	-	2	-	-	2	-
S. Dak.	-	1	3	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nebr. Kans.	1 1	3 4	31 164	31 103	22 16	42 26	-	-	-	-	-	- 1
. ATLANTIC	343	254	2,154	1,329	1,354	1,166	-	4	-	1	5	4
Del. Ad.	83	- 75	269	15 185	130	14 113	-	-2	-	- 1	- 3	-
D.C.	-	-	51	24	11	29	-	-	-	-	-	-
√a. N.Va.	27 14	37 8	122 25	146 53	163 20	152 15	-	1 -	-	-	1	2
N.C. S.C.	44 7	23 7	206 70	129 76	199 29	226 21	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ga.	95	63	859	279	442	218	-	1	-	-	1	-
	73	41	552	422	360	378	-	-	-	-	-	2
E.S. CENTRAL Ky.	68 2	46 12	361 119	367 47	385 40	428 69	-	2 2	-	-	2 2	-
Ténn. Ala.	38 26	20 12	144	131 48	212 79	202 57	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miss.	20	2	71 27	141	79 54	100	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	-
N.S. CENTRAL	47	62	1,189	2,222	652	1,014	-	-	-	1	1	-
Ark. _a.	1 6	2 16	63 57	126 89	91 44	90 143	-	-	-	-	-	-
Okla. Tex.	39 1	42	111 958	241 1,766	106 411	147 634	-	-	-	- 1	- 1	-
MOUNTAIN	127	123	670	853	411	484	-	- 1	-	1	2	- 12
Mont.	-	1	11	7	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
daho Vyo.	2	4 1	54 7	30 4	11 3	6 3	-	-	-	1	1	-
Cólo. N. Mex.	34 20	31 24	85 37	194 68	104 128	94 127	-	-	-	-	-	2
Ariz.	54	45	353	418	132	177	-	1	-	-	1	-
Jtah Nev.	7 10	11 6	68 55	57 75	26 43	24 47	-	-	-	-	-	3 7
ACIFIC	97	143	1,787	3,189	1,034	1,191	-	31	-	18	49	22
Vash. Dreg.	5 19	7 32	141 68	262 159	131 105	105 110	-	13 4	-	2	15 4	3
Calif.	44	35	1,561	2,742	772	953	-	12	-	11	23	15
Alaska Hawaii	6 23	45 24	14 3	13 13	9 17	11 12	-	- 2	-	- 5	-7	1 3
Guam	-	1	-	1	-	10	U	-	U	-	-	-
P.R. /.I.	1	4	119	233	176	260	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	2
Amer. Samoa	Ū	Ŭ	Ū	Ŭ	Ű	Ü	Ŭ	U	U	Ū	Ū	Ü
C.N.M.I.	-	U Inavailable	-	U	35 orted case	U	-	-	-	-	-	U

TABLE III. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending November 24, 2001, and November 25, 2000 (47th Week)*

N: Not notifiable.
U: Unavailable.
Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).
For imported measles, cases include only those resulting from importation from other countries.
Of 251 cases among children aged <5 years, serotype was reported for 120, and of those, 20 were type b.

Cum.			Mumps			Pertussis		Rubella			
2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	2001	Cum. 2001	Cum. 2000	
1,963	1,968	2001	197	293	50	4,247	6,435	-	21	165	
101 4 13 6 52	117 8 12 3 67	- - - -	- - - -	4 - - 1	1 - - 1 -	393 21 38 31 281	1,715 45 117 229 1,260	- - - -		12 - 2 - 8	
4 22	9 18	-	-	2	-	5 17	19 45	-	-	1 1	
197 57 39 46 55	231 69 40 47 75	- - - -	20 3 10 3 4	26 10 7 3 6	1 1 - -	263 131 44 18 70	643 320 82 30 211	- - - -	5 1 3 1	9 1 8 -	
251 69 36 44 60 42	357 84 41 81 109 42	- - - - -	19 1 3 11 4	22 7 1 6 2	3 3 - - -	594 231 79 68 129 87	756 309 107 111 110 119	- - - - -	3 - 1 2 -	1 - 1 -	
138 20 28 48 6 5	140 21 32 63 2 5	2 - - 1 - -	10 3 - 2 -	17 - 7 4 1 -	3 - - 1 -	312 146 33 92 5 4	548 331 53 84 6 7	- - - -	3 - 1 1 - -	2 1 - - -	
17 14	7 10	- 1	1 4		2	6 26	27 40	-	- 1	1	
342 4 38	262 1 26	- - -	37 7	43 - 9	1 - -	238 38	467 8 113	- - -	7 1 -	112 1 -	
37 13 62 34 47 107	38 13 36 21 44 83		- 8 - 5 5 7 5	10 - 7 11 2 4	- 1 - -	41 4 69 32 27 26	106 1 108 31 38 59		- - 2 1 3	82 27 2	
123 21 56 31 15	127 26 53 34 14	- - - U	9 3 1 - 5	5 1 2 2	- - - U	139 43 57 35 4	108 55 32 18 3	- - - U	- - - -	6 1 1 4	
316 18 61 28 209	207 12 43 26 126	- - -	13 1 2 10	32 3 5 24	2 - - 2	448 44 2 27 375	348 35 19 47 247	- - - -	1 - - 1	8 1 1 6	
85 4 7 5 31 10	4 7 1 32 10	- - - -	11 1 1 1 2	19 1 - 1 - 1	21 - - 8 -	1,214 37 170 1 261 135	729 35 59 4 434 85	- - - - -	1 - - 1 -	2 - - 1 -	
13 8 7	29 7 3	- -	1 1 3	4 6 6	11 1 1	509 76 25	73 24 15	-	-	1 - -	
410 60 40 295 2 13	434 53 64 301 8 8	- N - -	78 2 N 39 1 36	125 9 N 87 8 21	18 17 - 1 -	646 159 50 395 11 31	1,121 391 106 564 21 39	- - - -	1 - - - 1	13 7 6 -	
- 4 - U	9 - U	U - U U	- - - U	16 - - U	U U U	2 - U	4 9 - U	U - U U	- - - U	1 - - U U	
	101 4 13 652 4 22 1977 39 465 25 6 36 460 42 13 20 28 8 6 5 17 14 34 4 38 - 37 13 62 34 47 7 12 2 16 31 5 31 16 18 18 20 8 5 4 7 5 11 00 13 8 7 10 60 40 5 2 13 4 -	101 117 4 8 13 12 6 3 52 67 4 9 22 18 197 231 55 75 251 357 69 39 36 41 44 81 60 109 42 42 138 140 20 21 28 32 46 2 5 5 17 7 14 10 342 262 4 1 37 38 13 13 62 36 34 21 47 44 107 83 123 127 21 26 56 53 31 32 10 10 13 32 10 10 </td <td>101 117 - 4 8 - 13 12 - 6 3 - 52 67 - 4 9 - 22 18 - 197 231 - 39 40 - 46 47 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 20 21 - 21 - - 38 140 2 20 21 - 21 - - 5 5 - 17 7 - 14 10 1 342 262 - 37 38 - 13 13 - 41 10 1 34</td> <td>101 117 - - 13 12 - - 13 12 - - 6 3 - - 6 3 - - 4 9 - - 22 18 - - 197 231 - 20 55 69 - 3 39 40 - 10 46 47 - 3 55 75 - 4 251 357 - 19 68 84 - 1 36 41 - 3 42 42 - - 138 140 2 10 20 21 - 3 28 32 - - 138 140 2 10 20 262 - 37 38 26 - 7 33 - -</td> <td>101 117 - - 4 4 8 - - - 6 3 - - - 13 12 - - - 6 3 - - - 14 9 - - 1 22 18 - - 2 197 231 - 20 26 55 75 60 - 10 7 46 47 - 3 3 3 55 75 - 4 6 2 251 357 - 19 22 60 84 - 1 44 81 - 11 6 6 2 - - 1 20 21 - 3 - 7 4 6 2 - - 1 5 5 - - 1 1 4 3 342 262 - -</td> <td>$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$</td> <td>$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$</td>	101 117 - 4 8 - 13 12 - 6 3 - 52 67 - 4 9 - 22 18 - 197 231 - 39 40 - 46 47 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 36 41 - 20 21 - 21 - - 38 140 2 20 21 - 21 - - 5 5 - 17 7 - 14 10 1 342 262 - 37 38 - 13 13 - 41 10 1 34	101 117 - - 13 12 - - 13 12 - - 6 3 - - 6 3 - - 4 9 - - 22 18 - - 197 231 - 20 55 69 - 3 39 40 - 10 46 47 - 3 55 75 - 4 251 357 - 19 68 84 - 1 36 41 - 3 42 42 - - 138 140 2 10 20 21 - 3 28 32 - - 138 140 2 10 20 262 - 37 38 26 - 7 33 - -	101 117 - - 4 4 8 - - - 6 3 - - - 13 12 - - - 6 3 - - - 14 9 - - 1 22 18 - - 2 197 231 - 20 26 55 75 60 - 10 7 46 47 - 3 3 3 55 75 - 4 6 2 251 357 - 19 22 60 84 - 1 44 81 - 11 6 6 2 - - 1 20 21 - 3 - 7 4 6 2 - - 1 5 5 - - 1 1 4 3 342 262 - -	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	

TABLE III. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending November 24, 2001, and November 25, 2000 (47th Week)*

N: Not notifiable. U: Unavailable. - : No reported cases. * Incidence data for reporting year 2001 are provisional and cumulative (year-to-date). Incidence data for reporting year 2000 are finalized and cumulative (year-to-date).

	All Causes, By Age (Years)				P&I [†]		All Causes, By Age (Years)								
Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total	Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	P&I [†] Total
NEW ENGLAND Boston, Mass. Bridgeport, Conn Cambridge, Mass Fall River, Mass. Hartford, Conn. Lowell, Mass. Lynn, Mass. New Bedford, Ma New Haven, Conn Providence, R.I. Somerville, Mass Springfield, Mass Waterbury, Conn. Worcester, Mass. MID. ATLANTIC Albany, N.Y. Allentown, Pa.	. 16 18 28 11 ss. 20 a. 30 57 . 3 57 . 3 . 3 57 . 3 5 . 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	339 799 18 14 17 21 8 15 21 43 2 30 30 41 1,306 35	79 300 2 1 - 7 7 - 3 8 8 8 1 7 4 8 373 1 12	39 12 1 1 1 1 5 185 3 1	9 5 - - - - 3 - 1 32 1 -	4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	47 13 1 - 2 U 4 - 3 3 - 5 7 9 8 5 -	S. ATLANTIC Atlanta, Ga. Baltimore, Md. Charlotte, N.C. Jacksonville, Fla. Miami, Fla. Norfolk, Va. Richmond, Va. Savannah, Ga. St. Petersburg, F Tampa, Fla. Washington, D.C Wilmington, Del E.S. CENTRAL Birmingham, Ala Chattanooga, Te Knoxville, Tenn. Lexington, Ky.	U 50 48 44 1a. 40 148 . 100 . 16 495 a. 143	57 ∪ 31 29 29 34 103 53 9 321 52 46 20 23	2222 41 51 12 15 15 11 14 12 5 29 25 7 7 121 36 10 10 28	78 12 26 6 6 U 4 2 - 1 7 14 - 29 9 1 3 2	33 3 15 2 1 U 2 1 1 4 4 4 - 15 3 2 1 -	27 4 7 1 2 2 2 2 5 4 - 8 2 - -	58 1912 7 U 1 2 2 4 8 2 - 35 9 5 5 3
Buffalo, N.Y. Camden, N.J. Elizabeth, N.J. Erie, Pa.§ Jersey City, N.J. New York City, N.Y. Newark, N.J. Paterson, N.J. Philadelphia, Pa.§ Reading, Pa. Rochester, N.Y. Schenectady, N.Y Scranton, Pa.§ Syracuse, N.Y. Trenton, N.J. Utica, N.Y. Yonkers, N.Y.	102 25 10 40 39 Y. 1,085 U 15 252 30 18 86	82 16 8 326 699 U 8 1555 19 9 14 71 9 18 71 2 18 0 12 18 U	15 3 1 4 6 216 U 3 6 5 8 4 12 2 7 11 2 7 1 1 2 1 U	2 4 1 2 3 135 14 19 2 - 1 3 2 1 U	1 - 220 U - - - - 1 - - U	2 2 14 U 6 1 - - - - - U	5 1 -2 -43 U 12 2 1 4 1 -11 1 - U	Memphis, Tenn. Mobile, Ala. Montgomery, Al Nashville, Tenn. W.S. CENTRAL Austin, Tex. Baton Rouge, La Corpus Christi, T Dallas, Tex. El Paso, Tex. Ft. Worth, Tex. Houston, Tex. Little Rock, Ark. New Orleans, La. San Antonio, Te: Shreveport, La. Tulsa, Okla.	183 16 a. 16 904 63 2 ex. 23 90 322 90 322 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 89 89 89 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42	112 6 13 541 39 16 75 26 59 156 26 0 84 0 61	46 6 3 U 1777 12 5 24 58 13 U 21 U 15	12 2 - 93 11 2 10 - 5 43 2 U 9 U 10	7 2 - U 70 1 - 7 1 - 5 4 - U 5 U 2	6 - - 23 - - 21 21 - 11 - 10 5 U 1	11 2 - - - - 8 2 4 9 1 0 6 U 7
E.N. CENTRAL Akron, Ohio Canton, Ohio Chicago, III. Cincinnati, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Datroit, Mich. Evansville, Ind. Fort Wayne, Ind. Gard Rapids, Mi Indianapolis, Ind. Lansing, Mich. Milwaukee, Wis. Peoria, III. Rockford, III. South Bend, Ind. Toledo, Ohio Youngstown, Ohi W.N. CENTRAL Des Moines, Iowa Duluth, Minn. Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Mo. Lincoln, Nebr. Minneapolis, Min Omaha, Nebr. St. Louis, Mo. St. Paul, Minn.	165 32 83 29 38 39 71 521 521 521 521 10 521 521 10 0 47	872 17 2 U 3 6 3 9 0 6 6 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 6 21 29 32 5 36 37 5 9 40 5 9 0 1 6 6 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 6 21 29 32 5 36 37 5 9 0 6 6 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 9 27 11 3 25 5 5 3 8 3 3 5 5 9 2 5 3 5 5 9 2 5 3 5 5 9 2 5 3 5 5 9 2 5 5 5 9 2 5 5 5 5 9 2 5 5 5 5 5	261 5 8 U 12 3 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 14 7 8 6 13 5 9 7 13 2 U 17 9 19 14 15 8 U 17 9 9 5 3 5 25 5 14 7 8 6 13 5 9 7 13 2 U 17 9 9 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	60 - 1 U 2 8 7 6 14 - 1 - 2 - 1 1 4 2 27 3 1 U 5 1 11 2 3 1 U 3 1 U	18 - U - 4 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	20 1 - U 2 1 3 2 2 2 - - 2 4 - - - 2 4 - - - 3 - - U 2 1 3 2 2 2 - - - 2 4 - - - - 10 1 - - - - - 10 - - - - - - -	<i>1</i> 62307355412-92451346- ชุยาบรุงหรืองาบ	MOUNTAIN Albuquerque, N. Boise, Idaho Colo. Springs, C. Denver, Colo. Las Vegas, Nev. Ogden, Utah Phoenix, Ariz. Pueblo, Colo. Salt Lake City, Ut Tucson, Ariz. PACIFIC Berkeley, Calif. Fresno, Calif. Glendale, Calif. Honolulu, Hawai Los Angeles, Cal Pasadena, Calif. San Francisco, C San Jose, Calif. Santa Cruz, Calif Seattle, Wash. Spokane, Wash. Tacoma, Wash. TOTAL	31 1010. 60 102 1157 18 30 30 30 963 963 963 963 93 963 93 93 130 14 14 23 92 14 122 136 136 14 122 136 136 14 122 136 14 122 136 14 122 136 122 136 122 136 122 136 122 136 122 136 122 136 122 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137	104 15 78 21 61 97 650 4 55 4 56 70 17 80 ∪ 95 ∪ 88 13 88 34	$\begin{array}{c} 160\\ 12\\ 3\\ 8\\ 21\\ 38\\ 2\\ 36\\ 6\\ 13\\ 21\\ 175\\ 3\\ 18\\ 7\\ 7\\ 11\\ 30\\ 5\\ 16\\ 0\\ 25\\ 0\\ 17\\ 1\\ 14\\ 12\\ 16\\ 1,665\\ \end{array}$	58 7 1 5 9 9 1 13 1 5 7 79 - 15 1 3 4 17 1 10 U 9 U 6 3 5 - 5 648	32 4 1 2 4 3 - 7 2 5 4 31 - 5 - 1 4 4 - 2 U 4 U 2 1 3 2 3 2 5 3	16 	49 2 4 4 8 8 - 8 1 6 8 7 6 1 5 - 5 11 3 7 4 U 13 U 9 3 7 4 4 5 11 5 - 5 11 3 7 4 U 13 U 9 3 7 4 4 8 - 8 1 6 8 - 8 1 6 8 - 8 1 6 8 - 5 1 9 9 1 9 9 1 9 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9

TABLE IV. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending November 24, 2001 (47th Week)

U: Unavailable. -:No reported cases. * Mortality data in this table are reported voluntarily from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of ≥100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included. [†] Pneumonia and influenza. [§] Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks. [§] Total includes unknown ages.

Contributors to the Production of the MMWR (Weekly)

Weekly Notifiable Disease Morbidity Data and 122 Cities Mortality Data

Samuel L. Groseclose, D.V.M., M.P.H. Wayne S. Brathwaite

State Support Team Robert Fagan Jose Aponte Gerald Jones David Nitschke Scott Noldy Jim Vaughan Carol A. Worsham **CDC Operations Team** Carol M. Knowles Deborah A. Adams Willie J. Anderson Lateka M. Dammond Patsy A. Hall Mechele A. Hester Felicia J. Connor Pearl Sharp

Informatics

T. Demetri Vacalis, Ph.D. Michele D. Renshaw Eri

Erica R. Shaver

All *MMWR* references are available on the Internet at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/>. Use the search function to find specific articles.

Use of trade names and commercial sources is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

References to non-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to *MMWR* readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is not responsible for the content of pages found at these sites.

The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and is available free of charge in electronic format and on a paid subscription basis for paper copy. To receive an electronic copy on Friday of each week, send an e-mail message to *listserv@listserv.cdc.gov*. The body content should read SUBscribe mmwr-toc. Electronic copy also is available from CDC's World-Wide Web server at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr or from CDC's file transfer protocol server at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr. To subscribe for paper copy, contact Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402; telephone (202) 512-1800.

Data in the weekly *MMWR* are provisional, based on weekly reports to CDC by state health departments. The reporting week concludes at close of business on Friday; compiled data on a national basis are officially released to the public on the following Friday. Address inquiries about the *MMWR* Series, including material to be considered for publication, to: Editor, *MMWR* Series, Mailstop C-08, CDC, 1600 Clifton Rd., N.E., Atlanta, GA 30333; telephone (888) 232-3228.

All material in the *MMWR* Series is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission; citation as to source, however, is appreciated.

Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Jeffrey P. Koplan, M.D., M.P.H.	Director, Epidemiology Program Office Stephen B. Thacker, M.D., M.Sc.	Writers-Editors, <i>MMWR</i> (Weekly) Jill Crane David C. Johnson					
Deputy Director for Science and Public Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention David W. Fleming, M.D.	Editor, <i>MMWR</i> Series John W. Ward, M.D. Acting Managing Editor, <i>MMWR</i> (Weekly) Teresa F. Rutledge	Desktop Publishing Lynda G. Cupell Morie M. Higgins					
☆U.S. Government Printing Office: 2002-733-100/49030 Region IV							